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Informal Rulemaking by Settlement Agreement
JEFFREY M. GABA*
The process of informal rulemaking by the federal government is familiar. Af-
ter determining that a regulation is necessary, a government agency prepares a
proposal which it publishes for public comment. The agency then reviews the
comments, decides on the content of the final rule, and publishes the final rule
with a statement of basis and purpose explaining its decision. The rule is gener-
ally effective thirty days after publication, and the public is blessed with one
more government regulation.1
Although the description of this process is familiar, it may be incomplete. If
the experience of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is a guide,2 pro-
mulgation of regulations pursuant to the notice and comment procedure is
merely one step of rulemaking. In many cases, development of these "final"
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1. Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); see infra notes 85 to 90 and accompanying
text (discussing Act's requirements).
In addition to informal rulemaking, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides for develop-
ment of government requirements through formal on-the-record rulemaking as well as through trial-type
adjudications. 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556-557 (1982). This article is limited to the unique problems associated
with the use of settlement agreements to resolve challenges to regulations developed through informal
rulemaking.
Negotiated resolution of specific adjudicatory matters is common both in the administrative and the
enforcement context. See, e.g., RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DIsPUTES (L. Susskind, L.
Bacow & M. Wheeler eds. 1983); Huffinan, The Opportunities for Environmentalists in the Settlement of
NEPA Suits, 4 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.) 50,001 (1974); Jinkinson, Negotiation of Consent De-
crees, 9 ANTITRUST BULL. 673 (1964). The APA specifically provides for development of consent judg-
ments in adjudication. 5 U.S.C. § 554(c) (1982). See also 4 B. MEzINs, J. STmiN & J. GRUFF,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 31.02(5) (1985) (discussing consent adjudications under APA). The Depart-
ment of Justice has special procedures for publication of consent decrees in antitrust and pollution control
enforcement cases. 28 C.F.R. §§ 50.7, 50.13 (1984). Negotiation of such adjudicatory matters, involving
as they generally do application of existing laws to specific parties, raises questions very different from
those raised by negotiations of regulations of general applicability. The opportunity for public comment
in the context of rulemaking settlements also suggests different procedural concerns.
2. This article is based on an analysis of actions of the Environmental Protection Agency. The EPA
was chosen as the object of study for several reasons. First, it is one of the largest regulatory agencies in
the country. Second, the author was employed at the EPA for several years and is familiar with the
internal processes of this agency. Further, most observations of the process of rulemaking by settlement
agreement have focused on the actions of the EPA. See, eg., Cohen, Settling Litigation: A New Role for
Regulatory Lawyers, 67 A.B.A. J. 878 (1981); Compton, Success at the Negotiating Table: Not Just for
Steel Guidelines, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,171 (1983); Miller, Steel Industry Effluent
Limitations" Success at the Negotiating Table, 13 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENrTL. L. INST.) 10,094 (1983);
Rosin, EPA Settlement of Administrative Litigation, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363 (1985). However, the settle-
ment process described in this article is not necessarily limited to the EPA. Settlement agreements have
been used by the Army Corps of Engineers. See Settlement Agreement, National Wildlife Fed'n v.
Marsh, No. 82-3632 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 1984) (concerning responsibilities of Army Corps of Engineers in
issuing dredge and fill permits pursuant to § 4041 of Clean Water Act) (copy on file at Georgetown Law
Journal) [hereinafter cited as Dredge & Fill Agreement]. Professor Harter has noted settlement negotia-
tions by the Department of Interior and Department of Labor. Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure
for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1, 36 n.196 (1982).
1241
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
regulations is merely the first round in a larger process in which truly final regu-
lations may be promulgated only after the government and affected parties have
privately negotiated their contents.
These negotiations follow a lawsuit filed to challenge the "first round" regula-
tions. The result is a settlement agreement in which the agency agrees to pro-
pose specific "second round" regulations and the parties agree to dismiss the
litigation if the negotiated proposal is adopted. The first round rules serve as a
"proposal" for negotiation with prospective litigants, and the second round regu-
lations become the final rules.
What is the significance of this larger view of the rulemaking process? Settle-
ment agreements are hardly novel; courts encourage negotiated solutions as an
effective and efficient means of resolving lawsuits. 3 Nor are negotiated regula-
tions themselves unknown: the use of negotiations as a mechanism for develop-
ing regulations, a concept distinct from informal rulemaking by settlement
agreement, has received considerable attention lately.4 Finally, a properly
drafted settlement agreement does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). An agency merely agrees to propose a particular regulation while pre-
sumably retaining full discretion to modify the proposal in response to
comments.
5
Informal rulemaking by settlement agreement, however, is a phenomenon that
deserves close attention.6 First, the process raises concerns about the validity of
the final regulations it produces. Second round regulations are developed
through private negotiations with affected parties. Knowing that ongoing litiga-
tion will be dismissed if it promulgates the negotiated regulations, the agency has
a strong incentive to adopt the proposed revisions unchanged. Hence this pro-
cess raises questions about the good faith of the agency in promulgating regula-
3. Courts generally encourage settlement of disputes without trial as do several provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, eg., FED. R. EViD. 408 (evidence
regarding offers to compromise generally not admissible to prove liability or invalidity of claim); FED. R.
Civ. P. 68 (party defending against claim may offer judgment against him any time more than 10 days
before trial). See generally 10 J. MOORE & H. BENDIX, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 408.02 (1985).
In American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 661 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981), a challenge to certain EPA oil and
gas regulations, the parties had entered into a settlement agreement resolving all but four issues in the
case. Id. at 341. The court applauded the process: "The parties' commendable willingness to negotiate
their differences should not, and does not, go unnoticed by this Court. Nor do we hesitate to say that, as a
result of these stipulations, the issues before us are four in number, but narrow in scope." Id. at 346.
4. See Harter, supra note 2; Note, Rethinking Regulation: Negotiation as an Alternative to Traditional
Rulemaking, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1871 (1981); Recommendation of the Administrative Conference of the
United States No. 82-4, 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.82-84 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Administrative Conference].
In addition, Professor Harter has said: "Bills which would explicitly authorize [the use of regulatory
negotiation] have been introduced in each of the last three Congresses. None of these bills has had a
significant chance of passage, but they have focused attention on the issue." Harter, Regulatory Negotia-
tion: The Experience So Far, RESOLVE, Winter 1984, at 1, 5.
5. The agreements generally specify the right of the petitioners to challenge the action of the EPA if it
does not promulgate a final regulation substantially identical to the one negotiated by the parties. See
infra note 20 (citing agreements containing such language).
6. Although the development of regulations through settlement agreement may deserve attention, it
has not received it. Several commentators have noted the existence of the process. See, e.g., J. O'REILLY,
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING § 14.11 (1983); Cohen, supra note 2; Harter, supra note 2; Note, supra
note 4. However, there has been little analysis of the process. As Professor Harter stated, "Interestingly,
the settlement of litigation challenging rules has generated little attention in either the literature or regula-
tory theory." Harter, supra note 2, at 36 (footnotes omitted). For a recent discussion of some issues raised
by this process, see Rosin, supra note 2.
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tions. Second, assessments of current problems and possible reform efforts of
informal rulemaking might be incomplete if they fail to consider the subsequent
settlement process. Finally, familiarity with the role of settlement agreements in
developing regulations means greater understanding of how to influence the con-
tent of the final regulations. An understanding of the role of settlement agree-
ments may, if nothing else, affect a decision to intervene in a challenge to agency
regulations.
This article begins with a review of the role of settlement agreements in the
rulemaking practice at the EPA, one of the largest regulatory agencies in the
country. The article will examine the types, frequency, and possible effects of the
settlement agreements on the rulemaking process at the EPA. The article next
discusses the relation between rulemaking by settlement agreement and propos-
als for "negotiated" rulemaking. Differences between the two processes suggest
both the strengths and weaknesses of settlement agreements.
The article next will consider the legal issues relating to the settlement process
and to the final rules developed pursuant to these agreements. Although final
second round rules should be valid, there are a number of steps, relating both to
the structure of the agreement and to the courts' role in supervising the process,
which should be taken to ensure that the settlement process is not abused. This
article concludes with some suggestions for supervision of the process. It con-
tends that rulemaking through settlement agreement, if properly supervised,
may be an appropriate and effective way to implement agencies' rulemaking
responsibilities.
I. THE ROLE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN INFORMAL RULEMAKING
The role of settlement agreements in informal rulemaking at the EPA is varied
and complex; different types of agreements are used to structure various aspects
of the rulemaking process. A discussion of the various types of settlement agree-
ments and their practical consequences sheds light on the legal consequences of
those substantive agreements which actually specify the content of regulations.
A. TYPES OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
The process of developing regulations through informal rulemaking has sev-
eral stages, and court-sanctioned settlement agreements have been used at the
EPA to establish requirements for various aspects of the Agency's responsibili-
ties in the development and promulgation of regulations. Basically, these agree-
ments have fallen into one of three categories: scheduling agreements, process
agreements, and substantive agreements.
1. Scheduling Agreements
One type of settlement agreement that the EPA has used is a "scheduling"
agreement, which specifies the date by which the EPA will promulgate a regula-
tion. Agreements of this type are usually negotiated in the course of litigation
challenging the Agency's failure to issue regulations specifically required by stat-
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ute.7 Through scheduling agreements, the parties can establish specific time ob-
ligations, not contained in the statutes, for promulgation of these regulations.
For example, a scheduling agreement might specify particular times by which
proposed and final regulations must be published.8
The important characteristic of scheduling agreements is that usually they dic-
tate neither the content of final regulations nor the steps the Agency will take to
develop the regulations. Moreover, court-enforced scheduling agreements can be
an extremely important tool in keeping continuing pressure to bear on a some-
times sluggish bureaucracy. They have been used to structure Agency actions in
a number of regulatory programs that rely on informal rulemaking. 9
2. Process Agreements
Settlement agreements can also be used to structure the rulemaking process by
specifying not the date or content of a regulation but the process the Agency will
employ to develop the regulation. In resolving a series of lawsuits consolidated
in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train,'0 the EPA negotiated a con-
sent decree with environmentalists and industry intervenors that specified a com-
prehensive course of action the Agency would take to regulate the discharge of
toxic pollutants under the Clean Water Act.11 This process agreement, the so-
called Flannery Decree, required the Agency to investigate the discharge of a
7. Most of the major federal environmental statutes authorize "citizen suits" to compel the government
to undertake action that is "not discretionary" with the Administrator of the EPA. See, e.g., Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(2)
(1982); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a)(2) (1982). Litigation to compel "nondiscretionary" duty typi-
cally alleges a failure of the EPA to promulgate regulations specifically required by statute. See Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (suit to compel publication of
effluent limitations mandated by Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
In characterizing one lawsuit challenging the EPA's failure to promulgate hazardous waste regulations
required by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), one court noted, "This is simply a
deadline suit, nothing more. The sole purpose of deadline suits is to bring the equitable powers of the
Court into play to effectuate the declared intentions of Congress." Illinois v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 337,
339 (D.D.C. 1981).
8. See Settlement Agreement, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, No. 79-3442 (D.D.C.
July 9, 1980) (specifying deadlines for completion of data review and promulgation of new source per-
formance standards for offshore oil and gas facilities under Clean Water Act) (copy on file at Georgetown
Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Oil & Gas Agreement].
9. See Settlement Agreement at 2-3, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, No. 82-2234 and
consol. cases (D.C. Cir. Jan. 16, 1984) (calling for specific rulemaking to resolve National Contingency
Plan under Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9605
(1982)) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Contingency Plan Agreement]; Oil
& Gas Agreement, supra note 8 (scheduling rulemaking activity under Clean Water Act); Interview with
Lisa Friedman, Associate General Counsel, Solid Waste Division, EPA (Mar. 1, 1985) (discussing addi-
tional settlement agreements) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Friedman
Interview]. Such agreements also may be drafted by parties after the Agency has lost on the merits and
the parties are developing a schedule to be included in the court's order. See Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d at 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
10. 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120 (D.D.C. 1976), modified, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833 (D.D.C.
1979) modified, No. 72-2153 (D.D.C. Oct. 26, 1982), modified, No. 73-2153 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 1983 and
Jan. 6, 1984).
11. 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1982). This settlement, among other things, required the EPA by specified dates
to study and issue regulations controlling 65 toxic pollutants discharged by 21 primary industries; speci-
fied the legal basis, ambiguous under the Clean Water Act, for controlling pollutants that industry dis-
charges into publicly owned treatment plants rather than directly into navigable waters; established
timetables for regulating these "indirect" discharges; and required specific justification for failure to regu-
late an industry or pollutant. 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2122-29. See generally Hall, The Control of
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negotiated list of sixty-five toxic pollutants in a specified group of major indus-
tries.12 The agreement required the EPA to promulgate regulations limiting the
discharge of the pollutants except in narrowly defined circumstances. 13 In addi-
tion, the agreement specified the approach the EPA would use to regulate the
pollutants when they were sent by industry to municipal sewage treatment
plants.14 The agreement, however, did not specify the content of any final
regulations.
It may be misleading to refer to process "agreements," because the Flannery
Decree may be the only significant process agreement entered into by the
Agency. 15 Its importance, however, cannot be underestimated: the EPA and
other parties to the litigation, including industry and environmentalists, negoti-
ated a structure for implementing toxic control requirements, which is in place
today and which has produced significant results. The Agency probably would
not have done as much as fast without this structure. Questions have been
raised, however, as to whether such an agreement impermissibly restricts the
Agency's exercise of its discretion, 16 and it is unlikely that so comprehensive a
process agreement will be negotiated in the future.
3. Substantive Agreements
Settlement agreements can also be used to specify the substantive content-
even the precise language-of regulations. Substantive agreements arise in the
course of lawsuits seeking judicial review of a putative final regulation. In
resolving the lawsuit, the parties may negotiate a substantive modification of the
regulation that will satisfy their objectives.17 Settlement agreements resulting
Toxic Pollutants under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IowA L. REv.
609 (1978) (discussing Flannery Decree).
This settlement agreement was the basis for amendments to the Clean Water Act. As Senator Muskie,
floor manager in the Senate of the conference report on the 1977 amendments, stated: "The conference
agreement was specifically designed to codify the so-called 'Flannery decision."' 123 CONG. Rc. 39,181
(1977).
12. 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2125. These requirements were later expanded to apply to 34 indus-
trial categories and a more detailed list of 129 toxic pollutants. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System Permit Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998, 38,000 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 122, 124-
125).
13. 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2125.
14. Id. at 2124.
15. Mr. James Rogers, formerly Associate General Counsel at the EPA, described the Flannery Decree
as "sui generis." Letter from James Rogers to Jeffrey M. Gaba (Mar. 26, 1985) (copy on file at George-
town Law Journal).
16. In Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 111 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court, reviewing the
validity of the agreement, noted that the EPA and environmental plaintiffs conceded that the Flannery
Decree infringes to some extent the EPA's discretion under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 1127. The
agreement has also limited some of the Agency's discretion on allocation of funds. See infra note 73; see
also infra notes 119 to 168 and accompanying text (discussing issues raised in Citizens, in which Flannery
Decree was challenged as impermissibly limiting discretion of Administrator).
17. Although the parties may prefer a comprehensive settlement that resolves all issues, some settle-
ment agreements reserve specific issues for later litigation. See, eg., Settlement Agreement, Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 80-1607 and consol. cases (D.C. Cir. June 7, 1982) (concerning
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit issues in EPA's consolidated environ-
mental permit regulations) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as NPDES Agree-
ment]; Settlement Agreement at 2, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 80-1607 and
consol. cases (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1981) (concerning hazardous waste issues in EPA's consolidated environ-
mental permit regulations) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as RCRA Agree-
ment]; Contingency Plan Agreement, supra note 9, at 2.
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from these negotiations generally call for a second round of rulemaking to imple-
ment the agreement.18
In most cases, the Agency agrees to propose a revised regulation containing
the precise language agreed upon by the parties. 19 Although there is no explicit
agreement to adopt this proposed language, the settlement agreements generally
provide that if the negotiated language is adopted without substantial change,
the plantiffs will move to dismiss the underlying lawsuit. 20 In some cases, the
agreements have required the Agency to publish guidelines interpreting the ex-
isting regulations in a manner satisfactory to the parties. 21 Other agreements
have called for publication of specific language in preambles to regulations ex-
plaining the Agency's interpretation of its regulations. 22
The court can implement these settlement agreements in many ways. 23 In
some cases, the agreements have been embodied in actual consent decrees issued
as judgments of the court.24 Concerned about the inflexibility of judicially en-
18. Some agreements do provide for immediate action such as publication of regulatory guidance. See
infra notes 21 to 22 and notes 185 to 191 and accompanying text.
19. Recent settlement agreements, for example, generally specify that the EPA must propose specific
regulatory language contained in appendices to the agreement. The agreements also provide for prompt
completion of the rulemaking requirements, including submission of the proposal to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget for review, and prompt review of comments received during the public comment period.
See, eg., Settlement Agreement, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 83-1122 (D.C. Cir.
Nov. 17, 1984) (concerning petroleum refining effluent guidelines) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Jour-
nal) [hereinafter cited as Petroleum Refining Agreement]; Settlement Agreement, Porcelain Enamel Inst.
v. EPA, No. 82-2124 and consol. cases (4th Cir. Aug. 19, 1983) (concerning porcelain enameling effluent
guideline) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Porcelain Agreement]; NPDES
Agreement, supra note 17.
20. The NPDES Agreement provides:
If the final regulations that are promulgated, and the preamble language that is published, are
substantially the same as and do not alter the meaning of the language set forth in Exhibit C,
then the undersigned petitioners will voluntarily dismiss their petitions for review and their
district court complaints. . . and shall not seek judicial review of the regulations adopted pur-
suant to this Agreement.
NPDES Agreement, supra note 17, at 3; see also Petroleum Refining Agreement, supra note 19, at 4;
Contingency Plan Agreement, supra note 9, at 3-4.
21. The settlement agreement on RCRA-related issues in the consolidated permit litigation provided
that "EPA shall publish the Regulatory Interpretation Memorandum. . .set forth in Exhibit B to the
Agreement." RCRA Agreement, supra note 17, at 3, see also Settlement Agreement at 1-2, National Steel
Corp. v. EPA, No. 82-3225 and consol. cases (3rd Cir. Feb. 24, 1983) (incorporating similar language)
(copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Steel Agreement]; Settlement Agreement at
3, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 80-1607 and consol. cases (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(same; dealing with Underground Injection Control Program of Safe Drinking Water Act) (copy on file at
Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Underground Injection Agreement]; Dredge & Fill Agree-
ment, supra note 2, at 3 (same).
The agreements also have called for final, immediately effective, "technical" corrections to existing
regulations. See, eg., Underground Injection Agreement, supra, at 2; RCRA Agreement, supra note 17, at
3.
22. The settlement agreement on common issues in the consolidated permit litigation provides that not
only will the EPA propose specific amendments but that "the preamble to the proposed amendments shall
include, the same language set forth in Exhibit B." Settlement Agreement, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 80-1607 and consol. cases (D.C. Cir. Nov. 16, 1981) (concerning common and
New Discharger issues in consolidated permit litigation) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [herein-
after cited as Common Issues Agreement]; see also Steel Agreement, supra note 21, at 6 (incorporating
similar language).
23. Although the parties generally implement these agreements through court judgments or stays, the
agreements are also contracts between the parties themselves. See infra notes 147 to 168 and accompany-
ing text (discussing contract nature of settlement agreements).
24. See supra notes 10 to 14 and accompanying text (discussing Flannery Decree). Agreements also
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forceable agreements, the Agency has preferred recently to use the settlement
agreements as the basis for a motion to stay proceedings.25
Although it is difficult to determine the number of EPA regulations based
upon substantive agreements, 26 in recent years the Agency has relied extensively
on such agreements to implement major portions of its water, hazardous waste,
and air programs.27 Under the Clean Water Act,28 settlement agreements have
been widely used to establish "effluent limitations guidelines" which specify nu-
merical limitations on the discharge of pollutants by specific industries; 29 to set
the basic requirements for obtaining a pollution discharge permit;30 and to estab-
lish criteria for obtaining a permit to discharge material in wetlands. 31 The EPA
has also entered into a settlement agreement resolving challenges to the Under-
ground Injection Control program of the Safe Drinking Water Act.32
may be entered as stipulations resolving portions of a case. See American Petroleum Inst., 661 F.2d at 346
(stipulation of settlement resulted in revised regulations and narrowed unresolved issues).
25. See, eg., Joint Motion to Defer Briefing on NPDES Issues Pursuant to Settlement Agreement,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 80-1607 and consol. cases (D.C. Cir. June 9, 1982)
(copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal); Petroleum Refining Agreement, supra note 19, at 6; Dredge &
Fill Agreement, supra note 2, at 4.
Although the parties may request a stay, courts sometimes prefer to handle this matter in other ways.
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, in response to a motion for a partial stay of proceedings
pursuant to a settlement agreement, issued an order dismissing the litigation and directed the clerk to note
on the docket that "'this case has been terminated and no longer will be carried as an active case', but also
provides for the reopening of this case upon certain conditions .... Order, Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. EPA, No. 83-1122 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 1984) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal).
26. No filing system at the EPA could record the number or percentage of regulations preceded by a
settlement agreement. Nevertheless, to determine the size of the practice and the problem experienced by
lawyers engaged in such negotiations, the author interviewed attorneys in the air, water, and hazardous
waste divisions of the Office of General Counsel at the EPA. The Office of General Counsel is generally
responsible for helping to prepare regulations and defending legal challenges to regulations adopted by the
Agency. The attorneys with whom the author spoke had considerable experience with the Agency's use
of settlement agreements in its programs. The author also interviewed attorneys representing both indus-
try and environmental groups, who had participated in negotiating settlement agreements with the EPA.
27. The EPA also manages other major environmental programs, including toxic substances control
under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982), and pesticides manage-
ment under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, (FIFRA) 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-364
(1982). The programs under these statutes generally rely on specialized rulemaking proceedings that are
not governed by the informal rulemaking proceedings of the APA. See generally J. ARBUCKLE, G.
FRICK, R. HALL, JR., M. MILLER, T. SULLIVAN & T. VANDERVER, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HAND-
BOOK 223-27 (7th ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. There have been interesting developments
relating to the use of negotiated settlements under these statutes as well. The EPA has recently agreed to
propose regulations allowing greater public participation in Agency decisions under FIFRA. See [News
Notes] Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) Decision No. 13 (Oct. 5, 1984); cf Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1625 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (noting court's invalidation of EPA proce-
dures for privately negotiated testing procedures under TSCA).
28. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
29. Since 1981, the EPA has promulgated "effluent limitations guidelines" for 23 "primary" or major
polluting industries. Of these, 16 have been subject to court challenge, and a number of these challenges
already have been resolved by settlement agreement. See Letter from Susan Lepow, Office of General
Counsel, EPA to Jeffrey M. Gaba (Mar. 22, 1985) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter
cited as Lepow Letter]. For additional agreements see Settlement Agreement, Coal Ass'n v. EPA, No. 82-
1939 and consol. cases (4th Cir. Aug. 1, 1983) (concerning effluent guidelines for the coal mining manu-
facturing point source category) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Mining
Agreement]; Steel Agreement, supra note 21; Porcelain Agreement, supra note 19; Petroleum Refining
Agreement, supra note 19. See also [Current Developments] ENV'T RPTrR. 334 (June 28, 1985) (reporting
settlement of challenge to Aluminum Forming Effluent Guidelines). Additional agreements are still being
negotiated, and some agreements have been reached with individual parties to litigation. Lepow Letter.
30. See Common Issues Agreement, supra note 22; NPDES Agreement, supra note 17.
31. See Dredge & Fill Agreement, supra note 2.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 300h to 300h-4 (1982); see Underground Injection Agreement, supra note 21.
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It is somewhat easier to determine the number of settlement agreements relied
on to implement hazardous waste requirements under the Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA).3 3 Virtually all of the regulations issued under
this Act have been challenged and are the subject of substantive settlement nego-
tiations. 34 Some negotiations have been concluded by signed agreements; 35 ne-
gotiations continue on other challenges. 36 A substantive settlement agreement
was also used to resolve a challenge to the listing of priority hazardous waste
sites pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act. 37 Thus, almost the entire federal program for control of haz-
ardous wastes has or is being prepared, in part, through negotiated agreements
among parties to litigation.38 Guidelines for disposal of nonhazardous solid
wastes promulgated pursuant to the RCRA also were developed through settle-
ment agreement. 39
Implementation of the Clean Air Act4° has depended less on settlement agree-
ments than has implementation of the water or hazardous waste programs.41
Major aspects of the air program, however, have been developed through a sub-
stantive agreement, including requirements relating to the location of new
sources in areas with particularly clean or dirty air.42
B. CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN
RULEMAKING
Settlement agreements to resolve challenges to regulations are used primarily
33. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6907 (1982). The RCRA requires that the EPA develop a comprehensive set of
regulations controlling the disposal of hazardous waste by generators, transporters, and disposal facilities.
See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 27, at 187-221.
34. As one commentator observed, "Nearly all of the major rulemakings promulgated by EPA to im-
plement the hazardous waste program have produced litigation." J. QUARLES, FEDERAL REGULATION
OF HAZARDOUS WASTES, A GUIDE TO RCRA 46 (1982).
35. See RCRA Agreement, supra note 17; see also Friedman Interview, supra note 9 (listing series of
lawsuits and settlement negotiations involving regulations issued under RCRA).
36. As of April 1985, negotiations were incomplete in litigation involving the EPA's land disposal
regulations and "Phase I" RCRA regulations. Friedman Interview, supra note 9. Describing the status of
the Phase I negotiations, John Quarles has noted: "In the Shell Oil Co. case, no effort has been made to
work toward a single comprehensive settlement package. Instead, many individual issues have been re-
solved and EPA has initiated proposed changes in the original regulations on several points." J. QUARLES,
supra note 34, at 47.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (1982); see Contingency Plan Agreement, supra note 9.
38. As John Quarles has noted, "The conduct of these cases has been handled through negotiation rather
than briefing and judicial decision." J. QUARLES, supra note 34, at 46 (emphasis in original).
39. See 45 Fed. Reg. 71,818 (1980) (proposed modifications to guidelines for solid waste management
plans); 45 Fed. Reg. 72,709 (1980) (proposed modifications concerning criteria for groundwater and air
protection); 46 Fed. Reg. 47,048 (1981) (amended guidelines to expand public participation in planning
process and to hasten approval of portions of state plans).
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982).
41. For example, there have been no settlement aggreements involving national ambient air quality
standards, in part because the standards are established only after extensive hearings. In addition, actions
the EPA takes regarding specific provisions of State Implementation Plans under the Clean Air Act are
directed at states with which it is not common to negotiate. Interview with William Pedersen, Associate
General Counsel, Air Division, EPA (July 27, 1984) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter
cited as Pedersen Interview].
42. See [Current Developments] ENV'T Rm'r. 1639 (Apr. 16, 1982) (discussing settlement agreement
in Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, No. 79-1112 and consol. cases). Professor Harter also noted negotia-




to spare the parties the time, expense, and uncertainty of litigation.4 3 In this
regard, they do not differ from any other negotiated resolution of a lawsuit.44 In
the case of settlements that provide for second round rulemaking, however, a
number of other consequences are worth noting.
1. Commitment to the First Round Rule
Not all regulations are negotiated when challenged, 45 but when the EPA does
negotiate a revision to the first round regulation it is repudiating a position it had
determined to be proper. This willingness to negotiate immediately raises ques-
tions about the Agency's basis for developing regulations. One possible reason
for the Agency's change of position is that it promulgates its first round rules
with the expectation that these rules will be revised through negotiations. Dis-
cussions with the affected parties usually will alert the Agency to the likelihood
of litigation after first round regulations. 46 The Agency, therefore, can antici-
pate settlement negotiations. Perhaps the first round regulations do not repre-
sent the Agency's true position on appropriate final regulation, but are simply a
basis for negotiation and compromise.47 There is no indication, however, that
attorneys' advice on the substantive content of the regulations is consciously af-
fected by the prospect of negotiations. 48
43. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 880; Compton, supra note 2, at 10,171.
44. As the Supreme Court noted in the context of antitrust consent decrees:
Consent decrees are entered into by parties to a case after careful negotiation has produced
agreement on their precise terms. The parties waive their right to litigate the issues involved in
the case and thus save themselves the time, expense, and inevitable risk of litigation. Naturally,
the agreement reached is normally a compromise; in exchange for saving of cost and elimination
of risk, the parties each give up something they might have won had they proceeded with the
litigation.
United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971).
45. Interview with Colburn Cherney, Associate General Counsel, Water Division, EPA (Mar. 27,
1985) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Cherney Interview]; see Interview
with James Rogers, former Associate General Counsel, Air and Water Division, EPA (Mar. 26, 1985) (no
formal selection procedure regarding which issue will be negotiated and which litigated; depends on dis-
cretion of staff attorney) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Rogers Interview];
see also infra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing additional considerations regarding
negotiations).
46. See Cherney Interview, supra note 45 (information received during first round proposal indicates
likelihood of litigation); Rogers Interview, supra note 45 (attorneys in EPA's Water and Solid Waste
Division assumed major regulations from 1977 to 1980 would be challenged in court).
47. Ocassional proposals are developed that do not necessarily reflect the Agency's view on the content
of the final rule. Such proposals may identify options on which the Agency wants to receive comments in
order to preserve its flexibility to act without reproposal. Since it is often bureaucratically easier to retreat
from an extreme position to a more moderate one, a tough proposal may be published in order to make it
easier for the Agency to promulgate a final, less stringent regulation.
48. See Cherney Interview, supra note 45 (advice to program office on content of first round regulations
not affected by prospect of later negotiations); Friedman Interview, supra note 9 (EPA's decision on
content of regulation not directly affected by prospect of later negotiations; regulations strongest possible
under constraints of time and data); Rogers Interview, supra note 45 (justification of first round regula-
tions not a concern since regulations could subsequently be patched up).
The government is not the only party, however, whose conduct-may be affected by the prospect of
negotiations. For environmental groups especially, the knowledge that a regulation will be subject to
negotiations means less of their limited resources spent on developing comments on the first round rule.
As long as they submit sufficient comments to raise issues with which they are concerned, they can be
assured of participation in the later negotiations. Thus, the first round comments may be submitted less to
influence the rule than to ensure a place in later negotiations. See Interview with James Banks, Attorney,
Natural Resources Defense Council (Mar. 1, 1985) (copy on fie at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter
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If the prospect of negotiations does not affect the content of first round negoti-
ations, the troubling question remains why the Agency is willing to change its
position in the settlement agreements. Compromise of weak positions to avoid
litigation is an aspect of most settlement agreements. 49 As one might expect,
regulations with questionable legal or factual support are more likely to be
negotiated.50
It appears that this reversal represents a retreat, for purposes of avoiding liti-
gation, from a position the Agency believed was proper. Still, the reversal may
not reflect improper motives or suggest an unacceptable result. In some cases,
neither the Agency nor the affected community have focused adequately on the
issues during the first round process, and it is only during later negotiations that
the precise problems will be grasped.51 Although all available information
should have been submitted during the comment period,52 ambiguous informa-
tion may be clarified during negotiations. Also, because regulations are not
stayed during possibly protracted negotiations, parties receive important infor-
mation on the actual implementation of the regulations. 53
The Agency may also just change its mind.54 Parties may legitimately disa-
gree over vague statutes that require complex technical and economic judg-
ments.55 On additional reflection and discussions with parties, the Agency may
decide that there is a better position than the one it first adopted.5 6 Also, the
change from the Carter to the Reagan Administration expanded the range of
issues the EPA was willing to negotiate,57 and in many cases the negotiations
cited as Banks Interview]. One participant in negotiations has raised the concern that parties also may
take more extreme positions in the first round rulemaking knowing that there will be later negotiations.
See Harter, supra note 2, at 18 n.106, 37 n.199 (quoting Interview with Anthony Z. Roisman, Hazardous
Waste Section, Lands Division, United States Department of Justice).
49. See Armour & Co., 402 U.S. at 681 (discussing compromise in antitrust decrees).
50. See Cherney Interview, supra note 45 (attorneys consider environmental significance of changes);
Friedman Interview, supra note 9 (additional considerations include clients' interest, Administration's
interest, and possibility of "horsetrading" of challenged issues); Rogers Interview, supra note 45 (small
meetings of key people determine which issues worthy of defense).
51. One participant in the formulation and negotiation of regulations observed that in the early years
(pre-1977) of developing effluent guidelines, the EPA's efforts suffered because of time pressures from
court deadlines. He observed that industry comments were weak and noted that "the more meaningful
technical analysis took place after the issuance of regulations." Rogers Interview, supra note 45, at 2.
52. See Wagner Elec. Co. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1020 (3d Cir. 1972) (order of National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration amending motor vehicles standards invalid where no adequate notice of
proposed rulemaking).
53. See Cherney Interview, supra note 45 (although few comments usually submitted during comment
period on second round regulations, significant comments sometimes submitted).
54. As one court has noted: "Nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act prohibits an agency from
changing its mind, if that change aids it in its appointed task." American Petroleum Inst., 661 F.2d at 355.
55. The statutes that the EPA is implementing are extremely complex and in many cases contain am-
biguous requirements that reflect the results of congressional compromise. In many cases, regulations are
based on information on the frontier of science, such as the detection of extremely low levels of toxic
pollutants or the extent of health effects from exposure to environmental pollutants. In these cases, there
is often no correct answer, and the Agency is forced to choose from an array of equally possible choices.
56. An agency may get a great deal from settlement negotiations even if no final agreement is reached.
To the extent that the agency modifies its regulations in response to negotiations to make them more
credible and defensible, it has achieved most of its objectives. The EPA, for example, could use the
negotiations to obtain defensible regulations or to achieve an enforceable agreement. Rogers Interview,
supra note 45. There may be too much concern on an agency's part, however, in achieving a comprehen-
sive settlement when it could achieve a great deal without full compromise of its positions.
57. See Friedman Interview, supra note 9 (new Administration concerned with meeting content of
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appeared to serve as a vehicle for the new Administration to reconsider earlier
decisions.
2. Justification of the Second Round Regulation
When the EPA agrees to modify a regulation, the replacement is often the
result of compromise among the parties.5 8 The compromise might neither repre-
sent the preferred positions of those parties, nor be supported by any information
in the record.59 This is especially true of regulations containing specific numeri-
cal limitations.60
In preparing a proposal implementing a compromise, however, an agency
must prepare an explanation of the proposal, and, upon promulgation of the final
regulation, publish a statement of basis and purpose explaining its action.61 This
can be extremely difficult with negotiated regulations. In some cases, the pream-
ble to the proposal merely states the provisions required to be proposed in the
settlement agreement, and the final regulation merely adopts the proposal.62
3. Modification of the Second Round Proposal
After a settlement agreement is negotiated, the EPA has a strong incentive to
adopt proposed regulations without modification. In such cases, the Agency is
assured that ongoing litigation will be dismissed. 63 It is hard to ascertain the
extent to which this knowledge influences the Agency's decision to adopt the
second round proposal unchanged. But the consequence of a settlement agree-
ment is significant; in most cases the negotiated provision is adopted as pro-
posed.64 This need not reflect a failure of the Agency to consider adverse
comments, since most of the interested and affected parties will have participated
in the settlement. However, even when the Agency legitimately wants to review
independently the propriety of a second round final rule, the settlement agree-
ment will exert influence. Minor language or even substantive changes from a
settlement-based proposal must be reviewed, since the changes might be incon-
sistent with the settlement agreement, but such resistance to change is not neces-
RCRA regulations); Pedersen Interview, supra note 41 (new Administration substantially affected consol-
idated permit settlement regulations).
58. See Cohen, supra note 2, at 878; Compton, supra note 2, at 10,172; Miller, supra note 2, at 10,094.
59. One technique the EPA has used to bolster the record of the second round rulemaking is to require,
in the settlement agreement itself, that parties submit comments in support of the proposal. See Porcelain
Agreement, supra note 19.
60. This problem is far less acute when an agency is negotiating on legal positions that do not require
the same technical or data support in the record.
61. See infra note 87 (discussing APA requirements for publication of statement of basis and purposes
concurrently with promulgation of regulation).
62. The preamble to the proposal of iron and steel effluent guidelines merely recites that the proposal is
in accordance with a negotiated settlement agreement. In explaining a proposal to modify an existing
limitation on the amount of zinc a plant may discharge, the preamble merely states: "In accordance with
the settlement agreement, the proposed . . . [discharge limits] for zinc are slightly higher than those
contained in the final regulation." 48 Fed. Reg. 46,946 (1983).
63. See supra note 20 (discussing settlement agreements providing for voluntary dismissal of petitions
for review).
64. In only one case has the EPA rejected or substantially modified the negotiated proposal. See infra
note 66 (discussing NPDES regulations). Relatively minor changes were also made in the EPA's pretreat-
ment regulations. See infra notes 198 to 200 and accompanying text (discussing National Ass'n of Metal
Finishers v. EPA).
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sarily pernicious. Possible changes in any proposal are scrutinized if they are
likely to produce litigation. 65
Indeed, it is the Agency's willingness to modify negotiated proposals which
seems surprising. In recently promulgated National Pollutant Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) regulations, for example, the EPA rejected many of the
major positions it had negotiated with the parties in litigation challenging the
Agency's "consolidated" environmental permit regulations.66 Still, although the
Agency has been willing to reverse a decision contained in a settlement, such
changes have involved legal or policy decisions; specific numerical or technical
regulations have not been modified on second round promulgation.
4. Regulatory Reform
One aspect of so-called regulatory reform efforts involves review of regulations
by executive officials outside of the administrative agency. 67 Executive Order
12,991 establishes procedures by which the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) reviews major regulations to assess their provisions in light of an agency
prepared Regulatory Impact Analysis. 68 The Executive Order precludes the
agency from publishing proposed or final regulations until the OMB has had an
opportunity to review the regulation. 69
The Executive Order does not, on its face, require the OMB to review pro-
posed settlement agreements, and, as far as the author could determine, the EPA
has not submitted such agreements to the OMB before signing them.70 Review
of proposed regulations by the OMB is presumably not intended to be a mean-
ingless exercise. The OMB is authorized to comment on a proposed rule and, if
necessary, to delay publication of the rule until its review is concluded.71 But by
the terms of the settlement agreement, and sometimes by judicial order, the
Agency is required to propose the regulation notwithstanding comments by the
OMB. In most cases, industry concerns have presumably been addressed in the
settlement, and the OMB's comments can be taken into account in adopting a
final regulation. Nonetheless, settlement agreements can defeat the purpose of
some of the Reagan Administration's regulatory reform. 72 Thus, in considering
65. One commentator noted that he scrutinized changes from the negotiated proposal in the same way
he scrutinized a provision of a final regulation he thought could probably lead to litigation. Cherney
Interview, supra note 45.
66. NPDES Permit Regulations, 49 Fed. Reg. 37,988 (1984) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 122-125);
see also infra notes 198 to 200 and accompanying text (discussing pretreatment settlement agreement in
which EPA promulgated virtually all negotiated positions but court concluded that some slight changes
opened entire set of regulations to industry challenge). Although the EPA entered into the RCRA-related
settlement agreement in 1981, it has not yet proposed the negotiated regulations as required by the agree-
ment; perhaps it has had second thoughts.
67. For a discussion of current regulatory reform proposals, see generally Neustadt, The Administra-
tion's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 AD. L. REV. 129 (1980), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601,
at 431-34 (1982).
68. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982).
69. Id. § 3(c).
70. Several settlement agreements do specifically provide for prompt formal submission to the OMB of
the proposed amendments required by the settlement agreement. NPDES Agreement, supra note 17, at 2;
Porcelain Agreement, supra note 19, at 2.
71. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, § 3(0.
72. Settlement agreements have sometimes been the basis for the Agency's exempting a regulation from
the requirements of Executive Order 12,291. At its adoption in February, 1981, the Executive Order
called for a suspension of pending and proposed regulations that were not yet effective. Several exemp-
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regulatory "reform" efforts, the President and Congress should be aware of the
significance and scope of settlement agreements. 73
II. RELATIONSHIP OF SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS TO PROPOSALS FOR
"NEGOTIATED" REGULATIONS
One of the key elements of rulemaking by settlement agreement is the direct
negotiations among affected parties which lead to agreement on a second round
proposed regulation. Rulemaking by settlement agreement bears a strong resem-
blance to suggestions for "negotiated" regulations, which seek to cure a sup-
posed "malaise" in the current process of informal rulemaking by using
prerulemaking negotiations among selected parties in order to achieve consensus
proposals.74 Indeed, Professor Harter, who drafted the report of the Adminis-
trative Conference on the use of negotiated rulemaking, pointed to the use of
negotiated settlement agreements as support for the concept of negotiated regu-
lations.75 There are, however, significant differences between these processes,
and a comparison shows both the-strength and weakness of rulemaking by settle-
ment agreement.
Proposals for negotiated regulations have several basic elements: 1) identifica-
tion of regulations suitable for negotiation; 2) selection of a small group of par-
ties, representative of a range of interests, to participate in negotiations; 3)
private talks among the parties with the intent to promote compromise; 4) con-
sensus as to the appropriate proposed regulation; and 5) independent exercise of
the agency's judgment as to the content of the final regulation. These procedures
are intended to avoid the adversarial climate that some claim increases the time
and cost of rulemaking and produces extreme regulations. 76
There are several problems with negotiated regulations, which are avoided by
use of the settlement agreement process. First, the process of negotiated regula-
tions is probably illegal. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),77
which requires public notice and public access to meetings of a broadly defined
group of government "advisory committees," would probably prohibit private
tions from this requirement were specified, including conflicts "with deadlines imposed by statute or judi-
cial order." The EPA justified excluding several regulatory actions from the suspension because they were
required by the specific terms of a settlement agreement.
73. Settlement agreements can affect another major aspect ofbureaucratic control. To the extent that a
settlement agreement commits an agency to take action within a certain period of time, it can be useful in
obtaining funding for the responsible part of the agency. The obligation to commit funds to satisfy the
Flannery Decree is clear from an order issued by the judge directing the EPA to develop a revised schedule
for promulgation of required regulations which "shall reflect all possible internal and external agency
actions, under defendants' authority to accomplish or request, for minimizing or eliminating any material
effects on the suggested dates caused by resource constraints (both funding and personnel)." Order at 4,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, No. 2153-73 and consol. cases (D.D.C. May 7,
1982). Scheduling agreements and the Flannery Decree process agreement, which require preparation of
studies and analyses in support of regulations, may actually be welcomed by some members of the govern-
ment who receive a bureaucratic benefit from the commitment.
74. The current adversarial nature of informal rulemaking has produced problems often referred as the
regulatory "malaise." American Airlines v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 630 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
843 (1966); see Harter, supra note 2, at 1-28 (discussing problems with current approach to rulemaking).
75. Harter, supra note 2, at 36-38 (four prerequisites for successful regulatory negotiation present dur-
ing negotiated settlement).
76. See Harter, supra note 2, at 19-22 (discussing drawbacks of adversarial process).
77. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982).
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negotiations with a government selected and supervised group of affected par-
ties.78 Recognizing this problem, the Administrative Conference has called for
the amendment of FACA to allow for such meetings.79 This is not a minor
problem because negotiations intended to produce compromise and consensus
may need secrecy to be effective. 80 Settlement agreements, however, are devel-
oped in the context of ongoing litigation. This offers the possibility of privacy
and an established body of rules that secures the confidentiality of settlement
discussions.81
Second, negotiated rulemaking does not encourage parties to participate. In a
world of conflicting interests, it is naive to believe that parties with even closely
aligned interests will be able to agree on consensus proposals. 82 This is especially
true if consensus involves a trading of interests among parties. Negotiated
rulemaking fails to provide the incentive to force tough compromises. This
problem is reduced in the context of settlement agreements. In the absence of
compromise, parties face both the certainty of the government's existing position
on the first round regulation and the prospect of immediate, and potentially vex-
atious, litigation on those first round regulations.
Finally, negotiated regulations lack perhaps the most important element for
successful negotiations-a method of enforcing the consensus agreement. 83 Talk
is cheap, but if the government has no incentive to comply and the parties can
renege on the agreement by challenging consensus regulations, the prospect of
78. Id. § 10.
79. Administrative Conference, supra note 4, at § 2.
80. Almost all commentators on the negotiating process identify secrecy and confidentiality as impor-
tant elements in reaching successful results. See, eg., Cohen, supra note 2, at 80 (public meetings usually
do not provide atmosphere of frank discussion among parties); Compton, supra note 2; Harter, supra note
2, at 83 (discussing benefits of private negotiations).
81. See FED. R. EVID. 408 (evidence of statements of conduct made during negotiations generally
inadmissible); FED. R. Cxv. P. 68 (evidence of offer to settle claim inadmissible). The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act (FOIA) also exempts from disclosure material that would not be available to a party in
litigation with the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1982); see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 85-89 (1973)
(construing § 552(b)(5)).
Although FACA seems broad enough to include groups established to negotiate regulations, the status
of settlement negotiations as adjuncts to court proceedings should exempt these talks from the reach of
the statute. Such groups may be excluded from the definition of "advisory committee." 5 U.S.C. app.
§ 3(2) (1982); see Lombardo v. Handler, 397 F. Supp. 792, 800 (D.D.C. 1976) (committee on Motor
Vehicle Emissions of National Academy of Sciences not "advisory committee" under FACA). Or these
negotiations may be subject to the provisions of FACA that incorporate the FOIA exemptions from
disclosure, including exclusion of materials not discoverable during litigation. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10(b)
(1982).
82. One EPA lawyer noted that in the negotiations on RCRA landfill regulation only 10 out of 150
issues were common to more than 5 parties. Interview with Mark Greenwood, Esq. (July 30, 1984) (copy
on file at Georgetown Law Journal) [hereinafter cited as Greenwood Interview]. In some of the major
settlement negotiations, industry parties have tried to minimize their conflicts by forming an industry
steering committee to develop consensus proposals. This has not always worked, and in several agree-
ments individual industries would not accept the negotiated position. See NPDES Agreement, supra note
17.
83. Professor Harter recognizes that effective negotiations depend on assurance that an agreement will
be implemented. Harter, supra note 2, at 51. Nowhere in the proposal for negotiated regulations, how-
ever, is there any enforceable commitment from the agency that it will at least propose the consensus
regulations or from the parties that they will not challenge their own proposal. Assurance of implementa-
tion seems to rest on the good faith of the parties, represented by their active participation in the negotia-
tion process. Some benefit of participation is provided through Professor Harter's recommendation that
negotiated regulations be subject to a relaxed standard of judicial review. But see infra notes 237 to 247
and accompanying text (discussing standards of judicial review of agency rulemaking).
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using negotiated regulations effectively is dim. As discussed below, settlement
agreements are implemented by consent judgment or stay of litigation and are
premised on an enforceable promise that the plaintiffs will dismiss litigation if
the negotiated proposal is adopted.
A major weakness of rulemaking by settlement agreement is, of course, that it
occurs after the government has already gone through the time and expense of
developing the first regulation. Thus, although settlement negotiations may pro-
duce the perceived advantages of consensus regulation, they do so at a far greater
cost than negotiated regulations. Further, the strengths of rulemaking by settle-
ment agreement are perhaps its greatest weaknessess. Settlement agreements
work because of their secrecy and enforceability. Both of these "advantages"
raise questions about the legitimacy of the process and the final regulations it
produces.
III. VALIDITY OF REGULATIONS ISSUED THROUGH THE
SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Regulations developed through informal rulemaking are a major method by
which the federal government establishes requirements for private conduct.8 4
Through the notice and comment procedures specified by the APA, a federal
agency can obtain necessary information from affected parties. By publishing a
statement of basis and purpose, the agency gives the public an understanding of
its rationale and the courts a basis for judicial review.
There are few APA procedures for informal rulemaking. Section 553 merely
requires that notice of the proposed rule be published,85 that interested persons
be offered an opportunity to submit comments, 8 6 and that the agency, after con-
sideration of relevant matters, develop the rule and incorporate a concise state-
ment of basis and purpose.8 7 Although courts had begun to expand procedures
84. As one commentator remarked, "Most observers will concede that the legislating role practiced by
the Agencies exceeds in detail and volume that which Congress could practicably do." J. O'REILLY, supra
note 6, at 2. Federal agencies generally adopt requirements either through the formal rulemaking provi-
sions of § 553, or the process of adjudication specified in § 554.
85. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). The APA provides that this notice shall be "sufficient to fairly apprise
interested parties of the issue involved." In reviewing the adequacy of the content of a proposal, courts
have focused on whether the notice provides enough information to give the public an opportunity to
comment fully on the issues raised by the proposal. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d
375, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (EPA did not provide manufacturer with sufficient detail regarding test and
methodology to allow adequate opportunity to comment), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974). Notice is
generally satisfied by publication in the Federal Register. 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (1982); see Federal Crop Ins.
Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947) (appearance of rules and regulation in Federal Register gives
legal notice of contents).
86. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982). The APA requires at least 30 days for public comment. Id. § 553(d). A
longer period may sometimes be needed to comment on new information. See Portland Cement, 486 F.2d
at 393 (manufacturer not given enough time to comment on proposed rule).
87. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982). Although § 553(c) requires the publication of a "concise. . . statement
of... basis and purpose" in the final rule, the scope of that requirement is not well defined. It is clear
that an agency is limited in its ability to justify a regulation based on so-called "post-hoc" rationalizations.
See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir.) (under Clear Air Act, EPA must make threshold
determination that substance "poses significant risk of harm" before promulgating regulation), cert de-
nied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). Preambles also form an important part of an agency's explanations of the
rationale for its decisions. The preamble is not the complete record of the decision, however, and
rulemaking fies also are an important aspect of agency justification of its action. See Pedersen, Formal
Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 79 (1975) (proposing filing or docket system in
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in light of presumed inadequacies of the APA, 88 the Supreme Court in Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 89 called
a halt to this development of so-called "hybrid rulemaking" by holding that in
virtually all cases, the minimal requirements of the APA defined the procedures
necessary for informal rulemaking. 90
Settlement agreements generally provide for APA-required notice and com-
ment procedures before a final second round rule is adopted. If the APA defines
the minimum requirements of informal rulemaking and second round rules are
developed in compliance with the APA, what concerns can there be about the
legal validity of the settlement agreement process or the final regulations it
produces?
Settlement agreements implicate several issues regarding informal rulemaking.
For those portions of an agreement which call for notice and comment proce-
dures, the issues include the agency's vested interest in adopting the proposed
second round rule, the possible limitations of the agency's discretionary power,
and the exclusion of interested parties from development of the settlement agree-
ment. For those portions of an agreement that call for immediate issuance of
guidance or agency position memoranda, the question is whether these docu-
ments are rules subject to APA notice and comment requirements.
A. VESTED INTEREST IN ADOPTING PROPOSED RULE
A disturbing aspect of rulemaking by settlement agreement is the agency's
incentive to adopt a proposed second round regulation without significant revi-
sion. If the agency adopts the proposed regulation, it knows the lawsuit will be
dismissed or at least some issues will not be litigated.91 This raises the question
whether this vested interest has improperly biased the agency's review during the
second round rulemaking. 92 If nothing else, the agency's appearance of fairness
and good faith in the conduct of the second round rulemaking is in question.
which documents would be stored; files would be closed after promulgation of final rule and would serve
as basis for judicial review).
88. See International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (in controver-
sial rulemaking governing competitive practices, legislative-type hearing required beyond minimum op-
portunity for comment provided by APA). See generally Williams, Hybrid Rulemaking Under the
Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHi. L. REv. 401 (1975).
89. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See also Byse, Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of Administrative Proce-
dure: A Somewhat Different View, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1823 (1978); Rogers, A Hard Look at Vermont
Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699 (1979).
90. Id. at 548; see generally Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the D.C Circuit and the Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. Or. REv. 345 (1978).
91. Of course the fact that most proposals based on settlements are adopted unchanged does not mean
that the agency has acted improperly. One explanation is that the proposals are unchanged because the
agency, in negotiations with the affected parties, has finally made the right decision. See supra notes 49 to
57. These second round regulations, however, represent a change from the position the agency initially
identified as appropriate. The agency, of course, does not agree to modify or even negotiate all of the
positions it takes. Considering the manner in which the regulations were developed, the legitimacy of the
second round rulemaking and the good faith of the agency in conducting that rulemaking are open to
question.
92. Agency decisions on the content of final regulations are inevitably based in part on the likelihood
that a rule will provoke litigation. In the case of rulemaking by settlement agreement, however, the
agency is compromising previously adopted positions to comply with a specific and enforceable deal.
Although the effect of the agreement, compared to some unenforceable understanding by the agency of
the likelihood of litigation, may be one of degree, such distinctions are the stuff of due process. The
concern about an agency's vested interest is hardly frivolous. As discussed above, in only a limited
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The APA does not specifically require impartial decision makers in informal
rulemaking. 93 Although statutes and agency rules prohibit direct financial con-
flict of interest,94 no regulation or statute directly limits the types of bias or
vested interest suggested by rulemaking through settlement agreement. Any lim-
itation on decision making by a biased decision maker or agency must be found,
if at all, in principles of due process. 95
Due process constraints, including limitations on decision making by biased
officials, have been articulated in the context of adjudicatory, or trial type, pro-
ceedings. 96 Both legislative activity and the quasilegislative activity of informal
rulemaking, however, have traditionally been subject to few if any due process
requirements. 97 In part this is based on a view of the "legislative" aspect of
rulemaking, which frequently involves general "legislative" facts and policy
questions which are applicable to a large class of people and which would not
benefit from application of due process protections in factflnding. 98 It is also
based on a view that legislative activity inherently contains elements of bias. To
number of settlements has the agency not promulgated final rules substantially identical to the negotiated
positon. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
93. Compare APA § 554(d) and § 556(b) with § 553. Section 554(d) establishes requirements for impar-
tiality of decision makers in the context of formal rulemaking where a hearing is required to be made on
the record. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1982). Similarly, § 556(b) provides for removal of a presiding or partici-
pating agency employee in "on the record" proceedings on a showing of "personal bias or other disqualifi-
cation." Id. § 556(b). Section 553, however, contains no similar requirement of impartiality.
94. See, eg., 18 U.S.C. § 208 (1982); 5 C.F.R. §§ 401-412 (1985); 5 C.F.R. §§ 735.201-.210 (1985); see
generally Strauss, Disqualification of Decisional Officials, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 990, 997-1002 (1980).
95. In Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court strongly indicated that courts are not free to fashion addi-
tional procedural constraints on agency rulemaking beyond the minimum specified in the APA. 435 U.S.
at 549. Thus, any additional requirements on decision makers will be constitutionally based if they are to
be found at all. Although the Court did not completely foreclose the possibility of such additional re-
quirements, it strongly suggested that they would be required only in extremely compelling circumstances.
Id. at 543.
96. A series of cases indicated that in the adjudicatory context demonstration of some form of closed
mind or prejudgment of specific adjudicative facts may be grounds for disqualifying a decision maker. See
Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (public speeches by
chairman constituted impermissible bias and violation of due process); Pillsbury v. FTC, 354 F.2d 952,
963-65 (5th Cir. 1966) (pointed questioning by Senate subcommittee of hearing examiner before decision
rendered violated due process); Texaco v. FTC, 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Chairman's statement
concluding oil company violated Act constituted denial of due process where case before FTC hearing
examiner), vacated on other grounds, 381 U.S. 739 (1965); cf FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948)
(FTC not disqualified from adjudication where it had previously expressed opinion on issues).
97. Due process limitations on legislative activity are less stringent than those on adjudicative actions.
See Philly's v. Byrne, 732 F.2d 87, 92 (7th Cir. 1984) (notice and opportunity for hearing not required in
legislative action). See generally Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976). As the
Supreme Court has stated, control over the legislative process may be exercised and the rights of individu-
als protected "in the only way that they can be in complex society, by their power, immediate or remote,
over those who make the rule." Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915). Informal
rulemaking, distinguished by its focus on legislative rather than adjudicative facts, has many of the char-
acteristics of legislative activity. Strauss, supra note 94, at 993-97. Bias, or at least a significant commit-
ment to a rule prior to its promulgation, is also inherent in the rulemaking process. Id As Judge
Leventhal noted, "one cannot even conceive of an agency conducting a rulemaking proceeding unless it
had delved into the subject sufficiently to become concerned that there was an evil or abuse that required
regulatory response." Association of Nat'l Advertisers v. FTC, 627 F.2d 1157, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Leventhal, J., concurring), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980). Although there may be a basis for distin-
guishing rulemaking from legislating, see Linde, supra, at 225-30, or distinguishing rulemaking decisions
involving legislative as opposed to adjudicative facts, see Strauss, supra note 94, at 1041-43, the basic issue
of applying procedural due process limits to rulemaking is still being resolved in the courts. See Lead
Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1179-80 (D.C. Cir.) (due process requirement may differ between
adjudication and rulemaking), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980).
98. See 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.03 (1958). Compare Bi-Metallic, 239 U.S.
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a certain extent, elected officials and officials of administrative agencies are ex-
pected to implement preexisting policy biases. 99 Certainly one hopes that the
Administrator of the EPA is implementing a "bias" of the Agency in favor of
protection of the environment. Bias exists in rulemaking even beyond these gen-
eral policy views. In the context of individual rulemaking, agencies announce a
preferred position through proposed rules before they decide on a final
regulation.
Informal rulemaking by settlement agreement, however, suggests a type of
bias different from that normally encountered in rulemaking. First, it involves
an unusually intense commitment to a proposal because the agency knows the
litigation will be dismissed if the proposal is adopted. Second, it indicates the
intrusion of factors unrelated to the merits of the proposal into the development
of the final rule.
It is extremely unlikely, however, that a court would invalidate a regulation
on due process grounds, despite bias in the settlement agreement process. Case
law concerning decision makers with announced bias in individual rulemaking
proceedings and institutional bias in adjudications suggests factors that may be
considered in determining whether the vested interest reflected in rulemaking by
settlement agreement violates due process. But the case law indicates that due
process limits, if they exist at all, could only be reached on an extraordinary
showing of bias.
Attention has focused recently on rulemaking by decision makers with an-
nounced policy bias.1°° In Association of National Advertisers v. FTC,101 the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia articulated a very stringent test to
invalidate rulemaking on this basis.10 2 In National Advertisers, several advertis-
ing associations challenged the participation of the chairman of the FTC in deci-
sions on a rule, proposed under the Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission
at 445 (no prior right to be heard where rule is of general applicability) with Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S.
373, 385-86 (1908) (prior right to be heard where taxation measure affects particular group of people).
99. Legislators are elected precisely because they have articulated positions on public issues. See Linde,
supra note 97. This can raise questions when these legislators are placed in the role of adjudicators. See
Marmah v. Greenwich, 176 Conn. 116, 123-24, 405 A.2d 63, 67-68 (1978) (zoning commission acted
illegally in changing zoning regulations primarily to bar particular project).
In discussing why administrative decision makers are not disqualified for alleged policy bias in rulemak-
ing, the court in Lead Indus Ass'n v. EPA wrote, "The rule could hardly be otherwise, particularly with
respect to administrative agencies which are created for the specific purpose of accomplishing certain
tasks. Agency decisionmakers are appointed precisely to implement statutory programs, and so inevitably
have some policy preconceptions." 647 F.2d at 1179. See also United Steel Workers of Am. v. Marshall,
647 F.2d 1189, 1209 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (administrator not disqualified because of strong public position
taken), cert denied sub nom. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. Donovan, 453 U.S. 913 (1981); Carolina Envtl. Study
Group v. United States, 510 F.2d 796, 801 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (agency officials need not be impartial).
100. See United Steelworkers ofAm., 647 F.2d at 1208-09 (prior public statements insufficient to over-
come presumption of official's fairness); National Advertisers, 627 F.2d at 1154 (prior public statements
inadequate to disqualify chairman of FTC without clear showing of "unalterably closed mind"). See also
Strauss, supra note 94; Note, Bias in Administrative Rulemaking After Association of National Advertis-
ers v. FTC, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 886 (1979); Recommendation of the Administrative Conference of
the United States, Recommendation 80-4, 1 C.F.R. § 305.80-4 (1985).
101. 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 921 (1980).
102. In Lead Indus Ass'n v. EPA, the court noted that "Ass'n of Nat. Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC... is
the only case we know of in which an agency decisionmaker has been disqualified from participating in a
rulemaking proceeding on prejudgment grounds." 647 F.2d at 1179 n.151. See generally Koch, Prejudg-
ment" An Unavailable Challenge to Official Administrative Action, 33 FED. B.J. 218 (1974).
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Improvement Act,10 3 to limit television advertising directed at children. The
plaintiffs claimed that the Chairman's prior statements, in which he indicated his
belief that such a regulation was necessary, constituted impermissible bias. The
district court, relying on a bias standard developed in adjudicatory proceedings,
held that the Chairman "has prejudged and given the appearance of having
prejudged issues of fact involved in a fair determination of the Children's Adver-
tising rulemaking proceeding."'04
The court of appeals reversed, concluding that although bias might in some
cases disqualify a decision maker from the rulemaking process, as to these pro-
ceedings a commissioner should be disqualified only when there has been a
"clear and convincing" showing that the agency member has an unalterably
closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the proceeding.' 0 5 The
court stated that "[tihe 'clear and convincing' test is necessary to rebut the pre-
sumption of administrative regularity. The 'unalterably closed mind' test is nec-
essary to permit rulemakers to carry out their proper policy-based functions
while disqualifying those unable to consider meaningfully a section 18
hearing. '"106
This conclusion was based on the essentially legislative character of the
rulemaking. The National Advertisers court recognized a distinction between
specific adjudicative facts and the more policy-related legislative facts normally
implicated in rulemaking. It stated that the "view of a neutral and detached
adjudicator is simply an inapposite role model for an administrator who must
translate broad statutory commands into concrete social policies."'1 7 Although
the case dealt with formal rulemaking mandated by the Magnuson-Moss Act,
the court's logic should apply to informal rulemaking.
Agencies as a whole may be biased, and courts have in some situations re-
viewed the problem of "institutional" bias. As one court noted, "When Con-
gress creates an agency with an express mission. . . the agency officials will
almost inevitably form views on the best means of carrying out the mission."' 0 8
103. 15 U.S.C. § 57(a) (1982).
104. 460 F. Supp. 996, 997 (D.D.C. 1978). The court concluded that the rulemaking in this case had
the characteristics of an adjudicatory proceeding and then asked "whether 'a disinterested observer may
conclude that [the agency] has in some measure adjudged the facts as well as the law of a particular case
in advance of hearing it."' Id (quoting Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools, 425 F.2d at 591).
105. 627 F.2d at 1168-69. The Magnuson-Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act includes
many elements similar to on-the-record rulemaking. The Act, however, does not contain any explicit
requirement of impartiality. One issue in the case was whether the quasiadjudicatory procedures in the
Act converted the rulemaking into an adjudicatory act. The court of appeals rejected this position, con-
cluding that "[t]he proceeding is not adjudication or quasi-adjudication. It is a clear exercise of the Com-
mission's rulemaking authority." 627 F.2d at 1161.
One question is whether the decision in National Advertisers is limited to the specific situation of
rulemaking under the special procedures of the Magnuson-Moss Act. Although the court found that the
procedures of the Magnuson-Moss Act did not convert the rulemaking into an adjudication per se subject
to limitations developed in the adjudicatory context, the court's decision was in part colored by the proce-
dures and the history of the Act. Indeed, one commentator has stated, "Despite the trappings of constitu-
tional language and evident concern of the judges for 'fairness,' the decision in ANA is best understood as
a statutory holding only." Strauss, supra note 94, at 1034-35.
106. 627 F.2d at 1170.
107. Id. at 1168-69.
108. United Steelworkers ofAm, 647 F.2d at 1209; see also Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d at 1179
(agency decision makers inevitably have policy preconception because appointed to implement programs).
In addition to such policy bias, issues of institutional bias stemming from the combination of investigative
and adjudicatory functions have arisen. In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), the Court reviewed
1985] 1259
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
In reviewing claims of institutional bias, courts have not focused on the subjec-
tive impartiality of decision makers, but rather have focused on good faith com-
pliance with applicable procedures.10 9 In Carolina Environmental Study Group v.
United States,110 for example, the validity of construction permits issued to a
nuclear power plant by the Atomic Energy Commission (ABC) was challenged
in part on a claim that the AEC, then responsible for both the promotion and
regulation of nuclear power, had displayed an institutional bias in favor of nu-
clear power. The court stated that "agencies are required to consider in good
faith, and to objectively evaluate, arguments presented to them," but found that
the AEC had provided all parties a full opportunity to present their views and
that nothing suggested that plaintiffs had been denied the "fair play" that due
process requires. 11 The court held that this satisfied due process requirements
despite the possible partiality of Agency officials.
One other factor is particularly relevant in determining whether the institu-
tional bias of an agency should preclude it from acting. The "rule of necessity"
provides that actions by potentially biased decision makers must be allowed if
they are the only group empowered to make the decision.112 In FTC v. Cement
Institute,1 13 the Supreme Court considered whether the FrC's determination
that a practice violated the antitrust laws was invalid because the members of the
Commission had publicly characterized the practice as price fixing. The Court
observed that the statements did not mean the members' minds were "irrevoca-
bly" closed, and that disqualification of the entire Commission would effectively
immunize the trade association from regulation.114 Where an agency has the
sole responsibility for adopting a regulation, it is difficult to limit the agency's
authority to act because of bias.
An agency's adoption of a second round rule should usually be upheld under
due process requirements. Compliance with APA procedures should rebut any
suggestion of impropriety. Notice and comment procedures will give the public
an opportunity to present its views. The requirement of a reasoned statement of
basis and purpose will give the agency an opportunity to respond to any signifi-
cant comments and present the basis for its decision. Where an agency has not
adequately justified its final regulation, judicial review of the regulation should
prevent agency arbitrariness.11 5 Aside from a smoking gun indicating an
agency's unwillingness to consider reasonable views because of its interest in the
cases in this area and concluded that combination of functions in adjudicatory proceedings did not give
rise to a per se presumption of violation of due process. Id. at 46-55; see also Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at
700-03 (no due process violation where FTC adjudicated cases it had also investigated); Pangburn v.
CAB, 311 F.2d 349, 356 (1st Cir. 1962) (combination of investigative and judicial functions within agency
does not violate due process). In the federal context, the APA requires separation of functions for individ-
uals participating in adjudicatory proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1982). No such statutory requirements
apply, however, to informal rulemaking. Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d at 1179 n. 151. See gener-
ally Pedersen, The Decline of Separation of Functions in Regulatory Agencies, 64 VA. L. REV. 991 (1978).
109. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. at 701; United Steelworkers of Am., 647 F.2d. at 1209; Carolina Envil.
Study Group, 510 F.2d at 801.
110. 510 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
111. Id at 801.
112. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 247 (1920).
113. 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
114. Id at 701.




settlement agreement, it is hard to imagine a set of facts indicating that the
agency has acted in bad faith, and that its bias is so strong that its mind is
unalterably or irrevocably closed. 116
B. LIMITATION ON AGENCY DISCRETION
When the agency enters into a substantive settlement agreement, it commits
itself to taking actions-such as proposing a specific regulation or guidance doc-
ument-that are not required by law but that have been committed by Congress
to the agency's discretion. Although the agency at least nominally retains its
discretionary authority to decide the content of final rules, and presumably to
modify regulatory guidance, it has limited some of its discretionary power by
agreeing to take these actions.117 In question is the scope of an agency's power
to bind itself to take actions otherwise committed to its discretion, or as Judge
Skelly Wright described the issue, "the power of the Executive Branch to restrict
its exercise of discretion by contract with a private party.' 11 8
In Citizens for a Better Environm, ent v. Gorsuch,1 19 the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia considered whether the Flannery Decree impermissibly
limited agency discretion.120 Noting that the agreement limited the Agency's
discretion to some extent,12' the Citizens court nonetheless upheld the district
court's approval of the consent decree, primarily because the terms of the decree
were shaped by the EPA and voluntarily agreed to by the Agency. The court
distinguished cases that limited a district court's authority to impose a judgment
compelling federal agencies to take actions otherwise committed to their discre-
tion. 122 The court also noted that Congress had implicitly sanctioned the agree-
ment when amending the Clean Water Act in 1977.123
Judge Wilkey, in dissent, concluded that a consent decree embodying an
agreement of this kind was an impermissible infringement of agency discretion.
116. Judge MacKinnon, in his dissent in National Advertisers, stated that the majority's test, which
required proof of an unalterably closed mind, "in many cases is practically impossible to prove, imposes
too high a barrier to the public's obtaining fair decisionmakers . 627 F.2d at 1181 (MacKinnon, J.,
dissenting).
117. The agency agrees to propose a regulation on a subject that often is subject to its discretionary
control. For example, not all of the permit requirements that EPA agreed to propose in the NPDES
Agreement involved subjects which the Agency was under a nondiscretionary duty to address. See supra
note 17. Similarly, a substantive agreement binds the agency to propose specific language, the content of
which is normally within the agency's discretion. And having promulgated the rule, the agency must
follow APA procedure and justify in its statement of basis and purpose its rationale for adopting or
modifying the proposal. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). Finally, these substantive agreements often bind the
agency to publish immediately specific legal interpretations, the content of which are otherwise within its
discretion. See infra notes 185 to 191 and accompanying text.
118. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Watt, 678 F.2d 299, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
119. 718 F.2d 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert denied sub nom. Union Carbide Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2668 (1984).
120. Id. at 1127-30.
121. Id. at 1127. Although this case dealt with a "process" decree, the court's analysis is relevant to
substantive agreements. It is true that the process agreement at issue differs from a substantive agreement
in several respects. The Flannery Decree does not require that the Agency propose or adopt any specific
regulation, but rather requires that the Agency take certain steps to develop a regulation, outline the legal
approach to be used in developing the regulation, and specify the date by which certain actions, including
promulgation of the final regulations, are to be completed. See supra note 11. A substantive agreement,
however, has similar consequences.
122. See infra note 132.
123. 718 F.2d at 1129-30.
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The judge considered this question in the context of a consent judgment, which
he characterized as a "judicial act" and "not a contractual settlement agree-
ment."'124 Under these circumstances, he found that the consent decree was an
impermissible, presumably unconstitutional, action by the district court.
Noting the difficulty of distinguishing between "substantive" and "proce-
dural" requirements, Judge Wilkey rejected the Agency's arguments that the
consent decree specified only procedural obligations. 125 He dismissed arguments
that the EPA had consented to the judgment by indicating that the decree would
bind subsequent administrations. 126 The judge concluded that the decree was
beyond the equitable powers of the trial court because it mandated acts commit-
ted to agency discretion. 127
Judge Wilkey saved his strongest language for his views on the implications of
such consent decrees. The judge stated that "[t]he greatest evil of government by
consent decree, however, comes from its potential to freeze the regulatory
processes of representative democracy."' 12 He identified three consequences of
this evil, including the difficulty of citizens to monitor the decrees, the inhibition
of congressional influence on agency action, and the hindering of Executive
Branch control over agency policy. 129
Notwithstanding Judge Wilkey's impassioned dissent, the majority in this case
correctly concluded that settlement agreements will not normally interfere with
the exercise of agency discretion. It may be more appropriate to characterize
them as an exercise of agency discretion. Implementation of an agency decision
through a settlement agreement should not be unconstitutional, as long as the
content of the agreement is within the scope of permissible options available to
the agency and the requirements of the agreement do not contravene the require-
ments of the APA. Nonetheless, some of the concerns expressed by Judge
Wilkey deserve comment.
1. Coercive or consensual
Judge Wilkey characterized the Flannery Decree as a judicial act and not a
contractual settlement agreement.' 30 Apparently, he concluded that the trial
court's review and apparent modification of some portions of the agreement con-
verted this voluntary settlement into a court-imposed obligation.131
If the decree imposed requirements contrary to the EPA's wishes, there would
be serious questions whether the trial court had the authority to coerce specific
actions otherwise committed to agency discretion. 32 It is difficult, however, to
124. Id at 1130 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
125. Id at 1133-34.
126. Id at 1135.
127. Id at 1134.
128. Id at 1136.
129. Id
130. Id at 1134.
131. Id at 1130. Judge Flannery reviewed the original settlement agreement and required changes
before he would adopt the agreement as a consent judgment of the court. See Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2120, 2121 (D.D.C. 1976).
132. Although the majority and dissent disputed the proper characterization of the consent decree,
they both recognized that court-ordered relief not consented to by the government, which infringed the
exercise of judgment committed to agency discretion, was impermissible. 718 F.2d at 1128, 1131. In
National Ass'n of Postal Supervisors v. United States Postal Serv., 602 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1979), for
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characterize the provisions of the consent decree as nonconsensual. These provi-
sions were the product of long negotiations among the parties to the litigation
and were presented to the court as a settlement before the court had ruled on the
merits of the litigation. 133 Although the court reviewed the propriety of the set-
tlement and made some alterations, these alterations mainly limited the court's
role in supervision of the agreement. The court was seeking to make the agree-
ment less rather than more restrictive of the Agency's ability to exercise its ulti-
mate discretion on the merits of any final regulation.134 It was undisputed that
the Agency supported the final modified agreement. 135
A court's role in shaping an agreement does not make the agreement coercive.
It is in the nature of negotiations that parties may be presented with nonnegoti-
able conditions. Although additional conditions may have been required by the
trial court, the EPA presumably could have rejected the decree and litigated the
merits. Its decision to accept the consent decree was no different from the
Agency's decision to accept conditions important to other parties. This choice is
what distinguishes a consent judgment from a court-imposed judgment on the
merits. 136 Court review and even modification of a settlement agreement should
not turn a voluntary agreement into a court-imposed judgment. 137
2. Judgment or Stay
As noted above, the EPA has implemented settlement agreements both as con-
sent judgments and as the basis for stays of litigation. In perhaps the most inter-
esting portion of his dissent, Judge Wilkey concluded that the consent decree
was impermissible because it took the form of a consent judgment rather than a
stay of litigation. He explicitly stated that "the agency could. . . have agreed to
issue proposed regulations, with the litigation held in abeyance pending the issu-
ance of the regulations."' 138 Whether by consent judgment or stay of litigation,
an agency has committed itself to follow a particular course of action. Do the
example, the court dealt with a district court order that required the postal service to maintain a specific
salary differential of 25% between management and rank-and-file workers. The court held that the order
was improper because the postal service was vested with broad discretion over internal management. Id.
at 420; see also Public Service Comm'n v. Federal Power Comm'n, 543 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (exer-
cise of statutory discretion by Federal Power Commission presumed valid without showing of unjustness
or unreasonableness). See generally Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional Remedies and
Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.. 635 (1982) (trial court's exercise of remedial discretion appropriate
only when political bodies that should ordinarily exercise this discretion are seriously and chronically in
default); Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. Rnv. 61
(1978) (courts should limit equitable relief function by reference to separation of powers and relative
intrusiveness).
133. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2085, 2086
(D.D.C. 1982).
134. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2121.
135. As the EPA noted in a submission to the district court, "the then-Administrator not only con-
sented to its terms in order to avoid risks of continued litigation, but exercised his independent judgment
that the decree provided an appropriate means of implementing the [Clean Water] Act." Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2087.
136. See United States v. Ward Banking Co., 376 U.S. 327 (1964) (district court may not enter consent
judgment where government seeks relief to which it may be entitled and does not agree to terms of such
judgment).
137. See infra notes 232 to 236 and accompanying text (discussing role of court in reviewing substance
of settlement agreements).
138. Citizens, 718 F.2d at 1135 n.35.
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differences in form justify characterizing a consent decree as a threat to represen-
tative democracy?
There are several differences between a consent judgment and a stay that may
be significant in this context. A trial court may have greater authority to review
a consent decree than it does to review a stay. Because a consent decree is an
order of the court, 139 the court may review such a decree to determine if it is in
the "public interest." 140 A stay of litigation, however, is not issued as of right to
consenting parties. The court presumably has authority to review the grounds
for the motion for a stay to determine if it should be granted, and also can review
the merits of the settlement agreement. 141 Whatever the utility of such a review,judgment and stay are probably not different enough on this ground to warrant
different treatment of settlement agreements.
A second distinction between a consent judgment and a stay involves the abil-
ity of the agency to modify provisions of the agreement. A court can modify a
consent judgment if circumstances have changed sufficiently. 142 In implement-
ing the Flannery Decree, the judge said he was willing to consider requests by the
EPA for modifications. 143 If the agency seeks modification of an agreement con-
tained in a stay, it would (if compliance with the agreement were a condition of
the stay) have to file a motion with the court to alter the terms or duration of the
stay. Unlike a consent judgment, the judge could grant the motion without find-
ing changed circumstances.
A final distinction between a consent judgment and a stay involves the sanc-
tions for noncompliance with the agreement. Ultimately the value of the decree,
as Judge Wilkey notes, "depends on the court's willingness to enforce it should
the agency wish to adopt other procedures consistent with the act." 144 If the
agency could not repudiate or modify its position without incurring sanctions, its
ability to exercise independent discretionary authority conferred by Congress
would be seriously limited. Thus, the question of limitation of agency discretion
hinges on sanctions for noncompliance with an agreement.
139. As one court stated, "When a court has entered a consent judgment, it has made an adjudica-
tion." Brunswick Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 408 F.2d 335, 337 (7th Cir. 1969); see also United States v.
International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 506 (1952) (judgment entered with consent of parties may involve
determination of fact and law by courts); United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 112 (1932) (consent
decree is definitive adjudication).
140. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
141. As one commentator has noted:
All courts, federal and state, have a broad and inherent power to control their own processes to
prevent abuse, oppression, or unnecessary hardship, and to do substantial justice. Included
within this broad power is a general power to stay an action pending before it, as incidental to
control over causes on the court's docket, when reasonably exercised in light of all competing
interests.
IA J. MooRE & B. RiNGLE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 0.204 (1983) (footnotes omitted); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b); FED. R. APP. P. 26(b).
142. See System Fed'n No. 91, Ry. Employees' Dept. AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 653 (1961)(consent decree forbidding employer railroad from discriminating against nonunion employees modified
after legislation prohibiting union shop agreements amended to permit such agreements); United States v.
Swift & Co., 286 U.S. at 117-18 (consent decree dissolving monopolistic combination of meat packers not
modified to include wholesaling of groceries because no proof that reasons for restraint had vanished).
143. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 16 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2089.
144. Citizens, 718 F.2d at 1131 n.4.
1264 [Vol. 73:1241
RULEMAKING BY SETTLEMENT
3. Sanctions for Noncompliance
There is a potentially critical difference between sanctions for noncompliance
with a consent judgment and sanctions for noncompliance with an agreement
embodied in a stay of litigation. The terms of a consent judgment, issued as an
order of the court, can be enforced through the contempt power of the court. 45
This can be a major limitation on the agency's ability to change its mind about
the provisions of a settlement agreement.14 6 On the other hand, noncompliance
with a settlement agreement that forms the basis for a stay would presumably
only dissolve the stay and accelerate the underlying lawsuit In such a case the
agency is back in its presettlement position, and the agreement itself should not
be seen as a significant limitation on the agency's ability to change its mind.
Since the settlement agreement is in the form of a contract among the parties,
the question is whether the other parties could bring an action against the agency
for breach of the agreement. 147 If specific performance is available to enforce the
underlying contractual settlement agreement, the distinction between a consent
judgment and a stay seems minor.
Judge Wilkey cites an earlier District of Columbia Circuit case involving a
voluntary settlement agreement that the court said raised "potentially serious
constitutional questions about the power of the Executive Branch to restrict its
exercise of discretion by contract with a private party."'148 In National Audubon
Society, Inc. v. Watt,149 the court was asked to decide whether to enforce a vol-
untary agreement between the Audubon Society and the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, designed to resolve the Audubon Society's challenge to the government's
plans to construct a water diversion project.' 50 The agreement provided, among
other things, that litigation would be suspended and that the government would
145. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). This contempt power is available even in the context of negotiated con-
sent decrees. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 533 F. Supp. 869, 880
(E.D. Pa.) (noncompliance with consent decree on state automobile emissions program made party sub-
ject to contempt power), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982); Wagner v. Warnasch, 156 Tex. 334, 339, 295
S.W.2d 890, 893 (1956) (noncompliance with consent judgment regarding erection of cattle guard made
party subject to contempt order).
146. The threat of contempt for noncompliance with a consent judgment of this type may be more
apparent than real. A court probably would not find an agency in contempt if the agency asserted that the
reason for its noncompliance was a change in its view of its statutory obligations. Judge Flannery indi-
cated his willingness to modify the decree under such circumstances. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2089. The remedy for contempt also is largely within the
discretion of the court. See Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air v. Pennsylvania, 551 F.
Supp. 827 (E.D. Pa.), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1125 (1982). If the sole basis for concluding that such
decrees are unconstitutional is the threat of contempt for noncompliance, a court presumably would exer-
cise its power constitutionally. Still, a district court recently held the Administrator of the EPA in con-
tempt of court for failure to complete a rulemaking required by court order. Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus,
21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2153, 2157 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
147. Courts often have referred to the contract nature of settlement agreements. See United States v.
ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 238 (1975) (consent decree prohibiting Continental from
acquiring other bakeries to be construed for enforcement purposes as contract); Armour & Co., 402 U.S. at
682 (consent decree prohibiting direct or indirect dealing in certain commodities must be construed as
written and scope discovered within its four comers); cf Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co.,
343 F.2d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 1965) (consent decree regarding trademark not enforceable against nonparty
to agreement). Enforcement between the parties as a contract may be available. See Firefighters Local
Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); 1T, 420 U.S. at 238. Of course special problems arise if
the settlement agreement, as a contract, is sought to be enforced against the government.
148. Citizens, 718 F.2d at 1130 n.2 (quoting National Audubon Soc'y, Inc. v. Watt, 678 F.2d at 301).
149. 678 F.2d 299 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
150. Id. at 301.
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not continue on the project until two environmental studies were conducted and
Congress took certain action.' 5 ' Five years later, under a new administration,
the government argued that the agreement was no longer binding. 5 2
The court declined to decide whether the agreement was enforceable and con-
cluded that by its own terms the agreement had been satisfied.153 However, the
court worried that the agreement had limited government discretion. Judge
Skelly Wright noted that "[t]hese issues, although extremely interesting, are
novel and far reaching. We are not aware of any appellate cases determining the
enforceability of contracts between the government and a private party by which
the government promises to restrict its exercise of policymaking discretion."'' 54
The court alluded to "general principles drawn from dicta"' 5 5 in cases involving
constitutional prohibitions on state laws impairing the obligations of contract;156
the ability of one administration to change a policy adopted by predecessors; 5 7
limitations on the judiciary to direct the Executive in the exercise of its discre-
tion;158 and the binding effect of contracts made by one administration on its
successor.' 59 The court stated that "these broad principles might point to differ-
ent results in different contexts, depending on the legal rights of the private
party, the type of policy-making discretion involved, and the extent to which,
and for how long, the government's discretion is curtailed."'16
Similar concerns about the power of the government to restrict its discretion
by contract were expressed in Alliance Against Repression v. City of Chicago.16 1
In that case, several government agencies, including the FBI and CIA, had en-
tered into a consent decree that purported to limit the situations in which the
government could investigate potentially subversive organizations in the Chicago
area. After adopting the consent decree, the parties disputed the extent of those
limitations. The district court enjoined application of portions of the FBI's na-
tional investigation guidelines because they violated the consent decree. 162 On
rehearing en banc, the court of appeals reversed, saying the issue involved "the
proper standards for interpreting an equity decree that restricts the executive
branch of the federal government in the performance of its constitutional respon-
sibilities."' 163 The court acknowledged that the decree should be construed as a
contract, and that the intent of the parties should be drawn from the four cor-
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 306.
154. Id. at 305 n.12 (dictum).
155. Id.
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
157. See Wilbur v. United States ex rel Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206, 217 (1930) (ruling by Secretary of
Interior that Indian entitled to annuity was made in exercise of continuing administrative authority and
thus subject to change by successor); West v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 200, 220-21 (1929) (unauthorized
adjudication by Secretary of Interior regarding state's mineral rights could be reopened by successor
administration).
158. See generally Nagel, supra note 132.
159. Cf. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 587 (1934) (war risk insurance policies are contracts of
United States and not subject to repeal by Congress); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 730 (1879) (Sink-
ing Fund to assist construction of railroad and telegraph line reasonable regulation and warranted under
authority of Congress).
160. 678 F.2d at 305 n.12.
161. 733 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir.), reh'g en banc, 742 F.2d 1007 (7th Cir. 1984).
162. 561 F. Supp. 575 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
163. 742 F.2d at 1009.
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ners of the agreement. 164 The court focused primarily on the public safety con-
sequences of construing the agreement to restrict the FBI's ability to investigate
potential terrorist activity:
We doubt that in agreeing to the consent decree the Justice Depart-
ment tied its hands to such an extent; for if it did, it was trifling with
public safety of the people of Chicago, and maybe even violating the
President's constitutional obligation to "take care that the Laws be
faithfully executed."' 165
To avoid this result, the court interpreted the agreement as merely a restatement
of otherwise applicable constitutional requirements. 166 Although it did not in-
validate an agreement that restricted government discretion, 167 Alliance suggests
that courts will stretch to construe an agreement in order to avoid infringing on
constitutionally mandated discretion. 168
If, however, the limitation on agency discretion actually arises from the sanc-
tion for noncompliance, then this issue can largely be resolved by proper drafting
of a settlement agreement. Just as court implementation of an agreement
through a stay should have limited impact on agency discretion, since the conse-
quence of violation is merely resumption of the lawsuit, so too may the parties
provide in the agreement that their remedy for noncompliance is simply resump-
tion of the underlying lawsuit. Such a provision would eliminate any question of
impermissible contractual limitations on agency discretion.
C. EXCLUSION OF PARTIES FROM SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
Settlement negotiations between the government and affected parties are con-
ducted pursuant to litigation, and as such they are neither publicized nor open to
the public. Secret meetings raise troublesome but not unanswerable concerns
about the potential for abuse of the settlement process. Although only parties to
the lawsuit participate in development of the settlement agreement, all interested
parties have an opportunity to comment on the proposed rule before adoption.
Unless the agency's vested interest in adopting the proposal unchanged invali-
164. Id. at l011. The dissent is more explicit about the court's reliance on contract principles: "The
majority recites, but fails to apply the universally recognized principle that consent decrees are to be
treated like contracts." Id. at 1021 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1014.
166. The dissent characterizes the majority opinion as holding that the disputed portions of the consent
decree meant "only that the FBI would decline to conduct an investigation in violation of the Constitu-
tion." Id. at 1020.
167. The majority states that the only recourse the government would have if it entered a "foolish
decree" was to seek modification of it. Id.
168. Although the majority states that it should not "misread" an agreement to avoid a result, it also
states:
But it is one thing to misread a decree and another to draw back from concluding that a coequal
branch of government "improvidently" surrendered its constitutional obligations and exposed
the people of the nation's third largest city--exposed everyone in this country, for there is no
way to keep a Chicago-nurtured terrorist organization in Chicago, any more than the Nazi Party
could be confined to Munich-to the dangers posed by embryonic terrorist groups that are im-
munized from FBI investigation. If the consent decree will bear an alternative interpretation it
ought to be given one.
Id. (emphasis added).
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dates the process, the opportunity for comment should eliminate many concerns
about secrecy.
The practice of holding private discussions between agencies and affected par-
ties as part of the preparation of a proposed regulation is not new. Informal
prerulemaking discussion with interested parties was commonly used before
adoption of the APA, 169 and agencies today often hold informal meetings as part
of the rulemaking process. 170 Moreover, the APA does not limit an agency's
ability to engage in private prerulemaking discussions.1 71
Although regulations developed through privately negotiated settlement
agreements may be valid, Congress and courts have, in other contexts, been un-
easy about nonpublic contacts between a government agency and affected par-
ties. In some situations, federal statutes limit private discussions between federal
agencies and private parties during the rulemaking process. 172 The Federal Ad-
visory Committee Act, for example, establishes limitations on private meetings
by "advisory committees" which are broadly defined to include groups estab-
lished or used by an agency to provide advice or recommendations. 173 In re-
viewing the purposes of the Act, one court noted that "Congress was concerned
with the proliferation of unknown and sometimes secret 'interest groups' or
'tools' employed to promote or endorse agency polices . . . [and] established
openness to public scrutiny as the keystone of the Advisory Committee Act." 1 74
The Act stipulates that advisory committees must provide public notice of their
meetings, open the meetings to the public, and prepare detailed minutes.1 75
Congress has also recognized and has sought to limit the potential for abuse in
privately negotiated consent decrees in antitrust litigation. The Tunney Act176
was adopted in response to serious concerns that antitrust consent decrees were
169. See ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, REPORT OF THE ATrORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMIrrEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, S. Doc. No. 186, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 103
(1941) (discussing historical practice of consulting economic and other community groups).
170. See Home Box Office v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) ("informal contacts between
agencies and the public are the 'bread and butter' of the process of administration"), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
829 (1977). Agency rules often encourage these informal contacts. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.65(d) (1984)
(FDA rule allowing private meetings as of right); see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 401 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (citing benefits of informal contacts among agencies, Congress, and public, and referring to
commentators who recognize importance of informal contacts to information gathering by agencies).
171. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 400 (noting no decision limiting discussions before public comment);
Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 57 (distinguishing treatment of contacts with public made before notice of
proposed rulemaking with treatment of contacts made after).
172. These statutes include, among others, the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982); the
Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1982); and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 5
U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982). Although these statutes vary in scope and application, each reflects a policy
of hostility to secret government decision making. See Pacific Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality,
636 F.2d 1259, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (limiting Council's ability to hold closed meetings pursuant to 5
U.S.C. § 552b).
173. 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (1982). See generally W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.11 (1977)
(discussing Advisory Committee Act); Cardozo, The Federal Advisory Committee Act in Operation, 33
AD. L. REV. 1 (1981) (Act concerned only with advisory committees containing at least some members
who are not government employees).
174. Gates v. Schlesinger, 366 F. Supp. 797, 799-800 (D.D.C. 1973).
175. 5 U.S.C. app. § 10 (1982).
176. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1982). See United States v. AT&T, 522 F. Supp. 131, 148-49 (D.D.C. 1982)
(general discussion of background of Tunney Act); H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6535. Rulemaking settlement agreements differ signifi-
cantly from antitrust consent decrees, because rulemaking agreements in most cases are not immediately
implemented and provide an opportunity for later public comment.
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developed in "excessive secrecy" and failed in many cases to remedy adequately
the alleged antitrust violations. 177 The Act provides that antitrust settlements
must be published for public comment before their approval by the court, 178 and
the court is expressly given the responsibility to ensure that the proposed consent
decree is in the "public interest." 179 These requirements are designed to assure
"the integrity of and public confidence in procedures relating to settlement via
consent decrees." 180
Courts also have imposed limitations on private discussions with agencies
outside the public comment period of rulemaking. 81 Limits on these "ex parte"
contacts were in part developed to prevent the appearance of bias or unfair pres-
sure and to ensure that the public would be able to scrutinize and respond to any
material used in developing the rule. 182 These contact limitations, however,
were never extended to prerulemaking contacts, and the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia-primarily responsible for the development of these
limitations-has restricted their scope, especially in the area of informal
rulemaking where general policy making is involved. 183
None of the statutory or court-developed limitations discussed above specifi-
cally applies to settlement negotiations, but many of the concerns that produced
these limitations also extend to settlement negotiations. For example, even
though the public can comment on proposals after the private negotiations,
much of the content of the proposed rule as well as agency commitment to pro-
mulgation of a rule will be developed in private talks. Presumably, no record of
the settlement discussions will be made public; the agency's public rationale for
its decision will be developed after the fact, if developed at all. Those who do not
participate in negotiations may be at a disadvantage in influencing the agency's
decision with their comments. Viewed in this light, Judge Wilkey's concern
about limitations on citizens' ability to monitor agency action may not be mis-
placed. Ways to minimize this concern, including public notice of proposed set-
tlement negotiations, are discussed below.184
D. IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATORY GUIDANCE
Pursuant to several settlement agreements, the EPA has agreed to take legal
positions and publish regulatory guidance documents without first engaging in
rulemaking. These commitments have ranged from specifying a deadline for
177. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 148.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b)-(d), (g) (1982).
179. Id. § 16(e).
180. H.R. REP. No. 1463, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6535, 6536.
181. See generally Nathanson, Report to the Select Committee on Ex Parte Communications in Informal
Rulemaking Proceedings, 30 AD. L. REv. 377 (1978); Note, Ex parte Communication During Informal
Rulemaking, 14 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 269 (1979) (discussing D.C. Circuit cases imposing limits on
ex parte communications).
182. See Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 55 (great potential for bias in private rulemaking presentations).
183. See Sierra Club, 657 F.2d at 402 ("Later decisions of this court, however, have declined to apply
Home Box Office to informal rulemaking of the general policy sort .... ); Action for Children's Televi-
sion v. FCC, 564 F.2d 458, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (FCC role in determining broadcast policy subject to
review only if agency has failed to use reasoned exercise of discretion).
184. See infra notes 211 to 231 and accompanying text.
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complying with regulatory standards 8 5 to issuing detailed interpretations of reg-
ulations. 186 In a number of cases, parties have agreed that the settlement provi-
sions would be treated as final and effective before completion of the required
rulemaking. 187
Although the propriety of settlement agreements depends in large part on the
agency's later compliance with rulemaking provisions, the fact that some ele-
ments of the agreement are immediately implemented does not necessarily make
the agreement improper. In part, notice and comment procedures ensure that
there is no violation of the requirements of the APA, but the APA does not
require notice and comment for all agency actions. The informal rulemaking
procedures of section 553 extend only to certain types of "legislative" rules.' 88
Agency positions that do not rise to the level of rules or that would be classified
as "interpretive rules" are exempt from the informal rulemaking process.18 9 One
must analyze each case separately to determine if a particular agency position is
exempt from the rulemaking process. Legislative rules adopted without employ-
ing the APA rulemaking requirements would be invalid.
Employing subsequent notice and comment procedures is not only important
for technical compliance with the APA. As discussed above, potential for abuse
exists in a system that allows the government to negotiate positions that are
effective without public scrutiny. Negotiated regulatory positons are not neces-
sarily published in the Federal Register, 190 and the public might not be aware of
their existence. There is no formal opportunity for public scrutiny of an agency's
185. Steel Agreement, supra note 21, at 4.
186. RCRA Agreement, supra note 17, at 4.
187. Virtually all of the effluent guidelines settlement agreements provide that the parties will treat the
negotiated regulations as final among themselves before final promulgation by the Agency. See Petroleum
Refining Agreement, supra note 19, at 5 (each provision treated as duly promulgated rule after execution
of settlement agreement); Porcelain Agreement, supra note 19, at 4 (same); Mining Agreement, supra note
29, at 5 (same); Steel Agreement, supra note 21, at 4 (same). Essentially this means that the industry
parties will not contest inclusion of any negotiated limitations in a pollution control permit even though,
in the absence of final national promulgated limitations, they would otherwise be free to do so. (Nation-
ally promulgated effluent limitations may be challenged only in U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals within 90
days after promulgation. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (1982)). These provisions, which limit the possibility of
evidentiary hearings on the effluent limitations, are a major element of the settlement agreements. Pre-
sumably, they in no way establish the negotiated limitations as binding on nonparties to the agreement
until they are in fact promulgated. But see infra notes 204 to 210 and accompanying text (discussing
binding effect of agreements on nonparties).
188. The APA defines "rule" as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular
applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency ... " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1982). The
notice and comment provisions of § 553 apply to rules other than "interpretative rules, general statements
of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice . I... "d. § 553(b).
189. Some agency actions are considered preliminary to the adoption of rules and are not subject to the
requirements of informal rulemaking. See Environmental Defense Fund v. Costle, 636 F.2d 1229, 1256
n.94 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (modifications of Flannery Decree not "rules" subject to informal rulemaking
proeedings in part because were preliminary steps to development of proposed rules); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Federal Power Commission order
curtailing natural gas supplies general statement of policy not subject to APA); cf Pickus v. Board of
Parole, 507 F.2d 1101, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (promulgation of parole board rules subject to APA require-
ments). One commentator noted that "[t]he legislative history of the APA throws no light on what
Congress meant by 'interpretative,' and the case law interpreting the APA's term is sparse and unsatisfac-
tory." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 229 (1977).
190. The Dredge & Fill Agreement provides, for example, that the Army Corps of Engineers issue a
"Regulatory Guidance Letter" addressed to "Corps Division and District Engineers." Dredge & Fill
Agreement, supra note 2, at 2.
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action. Judge Wilkey noted that "[tihe abuses to which this device can be put
are limited only by the almost inexhaustible imaginations of litigants." 191
IV. CONTROL OF THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Whatever the legal significance of the secrecy and vested interest promoted by
the settlement process, these concerns suggest the potential for abuse inherent in
settlement agreements. Some limitations on the parties are required to minimize
the possibility of such abuse and to ensure that the settlement process will be
upheld. These relate both to the form of the agreement drafted by the parties
and to the supervision of the process by the courts.
A. FORM OF THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
Problems in the settlement process, including the Agency's disincentive to act
in good faith in second round rulemaking, can be minimized by proper drafting
of the agreement. Experience at the EPA suggests that the following elements
should, in virtually all cases, be included in a final settlement agreement.
1. Linkage of Issues in the Agreement
Challenges to first round regulations and later negotiations generally involve
more than one issue.192 In negotiating a settlement agreement, however, the
parties will often prefer a comprehensive settlement of all issues rather than
piecemeal resolution of individual problems. A comprehensive settlement
achieves a major objective of settlement negotiations-completely avoiding liti-
gation. 193 It also allows the parties greater leverage in negotiations by offering
the possibility of trading one issue for another. 194
Whatever the merits of a comprehensive settlement, a real problem is raised if
the settlement links all of these issues with a provision that allows the petitioners
to challenge the final regulations on all issues if the agency changes its position
on one issue. This possibility arises because most settlement agreements provide
that the parties must dismiss their action only if the agency adopts the negotiated
proposals substantially unchanged. 95 If the agency agrees to propose ten nego-
tiated proposals but adopts as final only nine of those proposals, the settlement
agreement could be construed as allowing the plaintiffs to challenge all ten regu-
lations. If a change in one regulation raises the possibility that all of the regula-
tions will be subject to litigation, there is even greater disincentive to deal in
good faith with problems raised during second round rulemaking.
191. Citizens, 718 F.2d at 1136 (Wilkey, J., dissenting). Judge Wilkey imagines possible abuses, sug-
gesting, for example, that the government could use immediately effective "procedural" agreements to
give industry advance notice of on-site investigation. Id.
192. In challenges to EPA landfill regulations under RCRA, over 150 issues were identified by the
parties. Greenwood Interview, supra note 82. Even in narrower and more technical challenges to effluent
limitations guidelines, settlement agreements usually contain distinct provisions on different aspects of the
regulations. See Mining Agreement, supra note 29.
193. Although in many cases, parties reserved issues for later litigation, see NPDES Agreement, supra
note 17, the perceived objective was to resolve the litigation completely if possible.
194. See Miller, supra note 2, at 10,095; Cohen, supra note 2, at 881; cf Citizens, 718 F.2d at 1124-25
(consent decrees save time, expense, and litigation; parties each give up something they might have won
through litigation process).
195. See supra text accompanying note 20 (discussing NPDES settlement agreement).
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This problem of linkage is not as unlikely as it may sound. The provisions of
past agreements have apparently linked all of the issues, 196 and, although
problems have developed, the EPA is apparently attempting to avoid linkage
now. 19 7 This issue arose in National Association of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 198 in
which industrial plaintiffs challenged an entire set of regulations developed by
settlement agreement because the Agency did not promulgate some elements of
the negotiated package. 199 The court, relying on the terms of the agreement,
allowed this challenge. 20° Had the Agency realized it would be reopening the
entire set of regulations to challenge by changing portions of the agreement, it
might have been less inclined to change its mind.
To minimize the danger of subjecting the entire set of regulations to litigation,
the settlement agreement should provide that if the agency fails to promulgate a
negotiated regulation substantially as proposed, the parties are free to challenge
only that particular regulation. Each rule should be insulated so that an agency
can make a good faith decision as to its final content, unaffected by the conse-
quences for other issues. Preclusion of linkage, although possibly contrary to
what plaintiffs might prefer, should be required by a court to ensure that later
rulemaking on a specific issue will be free from extraneous considerations relat-
ing to other aspects of the settlement agreement.
196. The Steel Agreement, for example, provides:
If, after EPA has taken final action under this Agreement, each individual provision of the final
steel industry regulation. . . or each preamble section is not substantially the same as or alters
the meaning of the language set forth in Exhibits B and C... the petitioners reserve the right to
proceed further with this litigation and to seek judicial review of any provision of the steel indus-
try regulation or preamble section.
Steel Agreement, supra note 21, at 3-4 (emphasis added).
197. For example, paragraph 12 of the RCRA Agreement specifies which issues may be challenged if
the EPA is in "noncompliance" by not adopting as final the negotiated regulations. It concludes, "If such
noncompliance occurs with respect to any other provision of this Agreement, the undersigned petitioners
reserve the right to proceed only with respect to those matters that are the subject of or are necessarily
related to such noncompliance." RCRA Agreement, supra note 17, at 7 (emphasis added). The use in the
agreement of the term "noncompliance" is an odd choice, since the EPA never agreed to promulgate as
final the negotiated regulations. The NPDES Agreement states in paragraph 3 that
if any final regulation or preamble is not substantially the same as or alters the meaning of the
language set forth in Exhibit C, or if EPA decides to leave any regulation or preamble un-
changed and not revised as set forth in Exhibit C, the NPDES petitioners reserve the right to
proceed further with litigation and/or to seek judicial review of such regulation.
NPDES Agreement, supra note 17, at 2-3 (emphasis added). Presumably "such" regulation that petition-
ers may challenge is only the particular regulation that is not in accordance with the agreement.
198. 719 F.2d 624 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985).
199. Id. at 636. This settlement agreement involved aspects of the EPA regulations under the Clean
Water Act regarding pretreatment of industrial discharges into municipal sewage systems. Id. at 633-35;
see Cohen, supra note 2, at 880-81 (discussing negotiations leading to the settlement).
200. 719 F.2d at 661. The court concluded that the industry petitioners had "offered to exchange their
right to contest the 1979 standards if the Administrator, inter alia, would both publish the suggested
language in the preamble and abide by that language." Id. Since the court found that the Agency's action
violated certain aspects of the agreement, including the failure to publish the suggested language, it held
that petitioners were "free to challenge the standards." Id.
In a footnote the court wrote, "EPA argues that if we permit them to challenge the standards, 'NAMF
and IIPEC [industry petitioners] will have obtained a very good bargain indeed.' We trust that the Ad-
ministrator made the. . . [changes inconsistent with portions of the agreement] in order to fulfill his
public duties under the Act." Id at 661 n.61 (citations omitted). That may be true, but petitioners did




2. Implementation of the Agreement
As discussed above, the form of implementation of the agreement may have
significant consequences. The basic question is how to implement an agreement
that gives private parties some control over future agency conduct, while contin-
uing to give the agency an opportunity to change its position on discretionary
matters. To accomplish this, settlement agreements should be used as the basis
for a request to stay litigation, and the parties should ask that continuation of the
stay be contingent on the agency's fulfillment of all specific requirements of the
agreement. As a contract matter, the agreement should specifically provide that
the sole remedy for noncompliance by the government will be resumption of
litigation of the underlying lawsuit. This minimizes the possibility that courts
will limit the exercise of agency discretion by the threat of contempt of court for
noncompliance and provides some incentive for agency compliance with the
agreement.
Such an agreement obviously gives far less assurance to the private parties that
the government will comply. There are, however, several reasons why this type
of agreement would still be useful to them. First, the prospect of resumption of
litigation, the primary reason for entering the settlement agreement, remains a
strong incentive for the agency to comply. Second, a major aspect of these agree-
ments is the commitment by the agency to take some action.201 Like scheduling
agreements, they place pressure on the agency to take actions that might other-
wise have been deferred.20 2 By insisting that the stay be expressly contingent on
the agency's timely compliance with all of the provisions of the agreement, par-
ties can maintain the threat of immediate litigation of the challenged regulations,
unless the agency submits a motion to modify the stay.20 3 Finally, a stay effec-
tively implements all of the significant aspects of the agreement. Even settlement
agreements implemented as judgments do not mandate a specific content of the
final regulation. After complying with the procedural elements of the agree-
ment, the agency is, in any case, free to modify the substantive decision, and
parties are only marginally better served by an agreement that gives them greater
powers to force the agency to comply with those procedural elements.
3. Binding Effect of the Settlement Agreement
To the extent that the parties can contract legitimately with the government
through these settlement agreements, the parties should be bound by their terms.
The government should be able to enforce against a signing party a commitment
to dismiss the litigation if the government has otherwise satisfied the contract.
The effect of these agreements on nonparties must still be determined. Regu-
lations might be modified based on an agreement to dismiss litigation, only for a
201. For example, the RCRA Agreement provides that the petitioners may proceed with the underly-
ing litigation if "EPA fails to take any action required under this Agreement as expeditiously as possible
." RCRA Agreement, supra note 17, at 7.
202. See Banks Interview, supra note 48 (discussing effect of consent judgments on timing of EPA
actions).
203. At the time of the modification of the Flannery Decree the intervenors sought a provision provid-
ing that no portion of the agreement other than that relating to deadlines be enforceable by contempt of
court. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833, 1840 (D.D.C.
1979). The court declined to limit its authority in this way. Id
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lawsuit to be filed on the second round regulations by, for example, members of a
trade association who were not individual parties to the settlement. Although
some trade associations say that their actions bind their members,204 others have
expressly declined to do so. 20 5
In final judgments, individuals are normally bound only if they are parties to
the action or are in privity with parties.20 6 In the case of large associations, it
may be difficult to get a specific agreement by all members to comply with the
settlement. Although in some cases, members of trade associations have been
found to be subject to judgments entered against the association, 20 7 the possibil-
ity exists that an individual member could challenge the negotiated compromise.
One technique the EPA has used to minimize this problem is to insert a provi-
sion in the settlement agreement requiring trade associations to notify all of their
members about the terms of the agreement. 208 Comments from members can be
solicited this way, and no individual company will be able to claim lack of
knowledge of the agreement in seeking to challenge the second round regula-
tions. The government may be able to assert that the person is estopped from
contesting the validity of the agreement.20 9 Even if the agency could not prevail
on a motion for dismissal of a subsequent challenge to the regulation, the indus-
try challenger may not be viewed favorably, because it failed to raise its objec-
tions during the settlement process.
Also, an agency might seek, as part of the settlement agreement, a provision
that would require the trade associations either to intervene or to file an amicus
brief in support of the government's negotiated regulation. Although this does
not preclude the possibility of a legal challenge, it would isolate the petitioner
and possibly strengthen the government's case.210
204. The Mining Agreement, for example, provides that "NCA [National Coal Association] has noti-
fied all of its members. . . of the terms of this Agreement. NCA has also notified its members that NCA
and EPA are entering into this Agreement on the understanding that NCA and its members would,
among other things, immediately comply with the agreement and not challenge the final regulations if
promulgated consistent with the agreement." Mining Agreement, supra note 29, at 6-7.
205. The Petroleum Refining Agreement provides:
The EPA and NRDC [Natural Resources Defense Council] expect and believe that when API
[American Petroleum Institute] executes this Settlement Agreement all API members will be
bound by the terms and conditions of this Agreement. API believes that the binding effect of
this Agreement is a legal issue about which API expresses no opinion. Nonetheless, API and all
members of its Litigation Steering Committee agree to be bound by this Agreement.
Petroleum Refining Agreement, supra note 19, at 7.
206. See Industrial Credit Co. v. Berg, 388 F.2d 835, 841 (8th Cir. 1968) (person in privity with party
to lawsuit bound by judgment); Smith v. United States, 369 F.2d 49, 53-54 (8th Cir. 1966) (parties bound
by judgment if adversaries in original action; irrelevant that appellant not original appellant but joined as
defendant); cf NLRB v. Lannom Mfg. Co., 226 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1955) (injunction not res judicata in
new proceeding against employer where employer not party to action and injunction did not run against
him), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
207. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc., 486 F.2d 717, 720-21 (7th
Cir.) (unnamed plaintiffs who were members of same association as named plaintiffs were in privity), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1113 (1973); Proctor & Gamble v. Byers Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 547, 557-58 (W.D.
Mo. 1973) (citing such factors as overlap of representation, joint interests of members and association,
and broad applicability of judgment to members as grounds for finding existence of privity).
208. See Mining Agreement, supra note 29, at 6.
209. See Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 166, 171-72 (N.D. 111.
1972) (carriers estopped from contesting validity of refund order where represented by single association
and waived objection to order).
210. One slim possibility is that the agency could seek certification of the petitioners as a class. See
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4. Record Support for the Agreement
As noted above, the substance of a negotiated proposal is often the result of
compromise with little support in the record. This obviously makes it difficult
for the agency to explain or justify its adoption of the final regulation. One tech-
nique the EPA has used to minimize this problem is to require in the agreement
that the parties submit comments supporting the proposed regulation during the
second round rulemaking. This bolsters the record and makes it easier for an
agency to justify adopting the proposed regulation. It also limits the parties'
ability to renege on the agreement by challenging the final regulation. If their
comments express nothing but support for the regulation, they may be prevented
from raising issues they did not address during the rulemaking. Finally, it fur-
ther isolates any potential member of a trade association who may try later to
challenge the final regulation.
B. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS
Some control of the settlement process resides with the court. Since the court
is in many ways an active participant in the settlement agreement, it should take
steps to ensure that the settlement process is not abused.
1. Notice to Interested Parties
When the government engages in rulemaking, it must publish notice of the
proposed rule in the Federal Register.211 No such notice requirement exists,
however, when an agency engages in negotiations to resolve a lawsuit.212 As
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See generally Parsons & Starr, Environmental Litigation and Defendant Class Actions:
The Unrealized Viability of Rule 23, 4 ENvTL. L.Q. 881 (1975); Note, Defendant Class Actions, 91 HARV.
L. REv. 630 (1978) (defendant class actions expand scope of collateral estoppel to nonparties). Despite
problems of representation, certification of defendant classes has been authorized in several contexts. See
In re Itel Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 104, 114, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (purchasers entitled to certification of
defendant classes of underwriters who allegedly made debenture offerings pursuant to registration state-
ments and prospectus containing material representations or omissions); In re GAP Stores Sec. Litig., 79
F.R.D. 283, 295-302, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (defendant class certified under Securities Act section confer-
ring cause of action on purchaser of security issued under registration statement containing material mis-
statement or omission). But see Guarantee Ins. Agency v. Mid-Continental Realty Corp., 57 F.R.D. 555
(N.D. Ill. 1972) (membership in class limited to those who purchased stock in reliance on prospectus
rather than all who purchased without disclosure of material fact).
Most of the relevant statutes provide for original review of EPA regulations in a United States court of
appeals. See, eg., 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1982); 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (1982). Interesting questions arise as
to the use of class action mechanisms in original jurisdiction in the court of appeals where, for example,
the federal rules do not explicitly provide for class actions. In this context the government is the respon-
dent in an action brought by industry or environmental petitioners. Presumably some form of counter-
claim by the government seeking a declaratory judgment would be necessary to convert petitioners into
the defendant for purpose of class certification.
211. The APA requires that "general notice of proposed rulemaking shall be published in the Federal
Register ... ." 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1982). Actual notice may also be sufficient. Id Publication in the
Federal Register is also held to be constructive notice of the final rule. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill,
332 U.S. at 385.
212. Some courts, however, have indicated that due process requires notice to parties directly affected
by consent decrees before approval. See Cunningham v. English, 269 F.2d 539, 541 (D.C. Cir.) (notice
required for all members of union in suit brought by local against parent union), cert denied, 361 U.S. 905
(1959). In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 12 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1833 (1979), the
court held that notice was not required in the context of a settlement agreement that did not directly and
immediately affect the parties. Id at 1838-40. Since the settlement agreement required the EPA to initi-
ate rulemaking proceedings for certain pollutants and industries, the intervenors would have an opportu-
nity to participate in the promulgation of a final regulation. Id at 1839.
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Judge Wilkey noted in dissent in Citizens:
Those third parties who wish to know of such consent decrees would
be faced with the nearly impossible task of monitoring all of the na-
tion's district courts. Even then, if the filing of the suit and the consent
decree coincide closely in time, notice would amount only to learning
that the binding decree is afait aCcompli.2 13
Notice of negotiations may be important to an interest group trying to influence
the outcome of a regulation, since most significant decisions will be made during
settlement negotiations in the second round rulemaking process. Without
proper notice, even people who know of the lawsuit may not be aware of the
existence and scope of negotiations.
It is difficult to determine whether lack of notice has affected participation in
negotiations. Trade associations and major industries can ensure that they have
notice of developments that may affect them. So can major environmental
groups, such as Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) and Environmen-
tal Defense Fund (EDF). It is unclear whether the lack of participation in settle-
ment litigation by other environmental groups or smaller individual industries
results from a lack of notice or lack of interest. 2 14 Smaller groups should not
believe that major national organizations will always represent their interests.2 15
In some cases the court might require the government to publish notice of its
intention to negotiate a challenge to regulations. This would give interested par-
ties an opportunity to intervene in the lawsuit in a timely manner. Publishing
notice of prospective settlement negotiations may also benefit the original par-
ties. A deadline for intervention specified in the notice could help the courts
determine timeliness for intervention under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.2 16 Although a per se rule requiring notice of negotiations in all chal-
lenges to rulemaking may be a good idea, courts may prefer to limit the require-
ment to those cases in which a limited number of parties are involved in the
negotiations or where wide-ranging interests are at stake.
2. Intervention
If an agency's flexibility to respond to comments of interested parties is limited
after settlement negotiations, participation in the settlement talks is obviously
important to parties that want to protect their special interest. These parties
may not have filed a challenge to the first round regulation because they were
satisfied with its content or were willing to let another party resolve the legal
issues in the original regulation. Failure to file an initial challenge does not indi-
213. 718 F.2d at 1136 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
214. Cf Banks Interview, supra note 48 (indicating that NRDC did not participate in some negotia-
tions, because of lack of funding or lack of expert staff members).
215. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 913 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (lower
court erred in concluding that parties in suit would adequately represent nonparties' interest in regula-
tions of particular industries).
216. Under rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, only timely motions for intervention as
of right will be granted. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). Determination of whether a motion to intervene is timely
is "to be determined from all the circumstances." NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973). See
Hodgson v. UMW, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (timeliness factors may include amount of time




cate a lack of interest in participating in negotiations.217
A party's ability to participate in a lawsuit depends on the court's interpreta-
tion of its interests under rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That
rule provides, among other things, that a party may intervene as of right
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or trans-
action which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties.218
Thus, the key elements in determining whether to grant a party's request to in-
tervene are whether its interests will be affected and whether those interests are
being adequately represented by existing parties.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle,219 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia dealt with a party's right to intervene in litigation
being resolved by settlement agreement. There, the settlement agreement had
been developed by the EPA, environmental groups, and a number of industrial
companies and trade associations that had initially been granted leave to inter-
vene. Before the district court approved the settlement, industrial companies
moved to intervene.220 The district court denied intervention after determining
that the requests were not timely, that the interests of the parties would not be
impaired because they would have an adequate opportunity to participate when
regulations were proposed, and that their interests were adequately represented
by the EPA and the existing industry intervenors. 221
The Court of Appeals reversed and allowed intervention. In addition to find-
ing that the motions were timely, the court in Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc. v. Costle addressed two other significant issues concerning petitions for
intervention in ongoing settlement negotiations-impairment of interest and ade-
quacy of representation. The government argued that the interests of the ex-
cluded parties would not be impaired, since they would have an opportunity to
comment on any regulation the agency proposed in response to the settlement
agreement. 222 Rejecting this, the court held that under rule 24(a)(2), the test is
whether denial of intervention works a "practical impairment" of interests. 22
3
The court found that denying the intervenors the right to participate in several
aspects of the settlement, including decisions not to regulate an industry or a
pollutant and proceedings to modify the timetable for action, would as a practi-
cal matter have a direct impact on them. 224 Later opportunity to challenge the
regulation would not lessen the harm of excluding them from participation. 225
217. In the litigation of the porcelain enameling effluent limitations, only the government and industry
representatives participated in negotiations. See Porcelain Agreement, supra note 19. In part, this reflects
the limited resources of the major environmental groups, which must pick and choose the litigation in
which they wish to participate. Banks Interview, supra note 48.
218. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).
219. 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
220. Id. at 907.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 909.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 910.
225. Id. at 909-11.
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Applying the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Trbovich v. United
Mine Workers ofAmerica,226 the court found that the intervenors "'met the min-
imal burden' of showing that existing representation 'may be' inadequate to pro-
tect their interest[s]." 227 In the absence of specific examples in the record
illustrating how the intervenors' interests might diverge from the EPA's, the
court hypothesized factual issues over which they might disagree.228 The court
also found that even if the interests were the same, the intervenors were likely to
mount a more vigorous defense than the EPA because the former had a greater
stake in the content of the final regulations. 229 The court also found that repre-
sentation by existing industry parties might not adequately protect the prospec-
tive intevenors from other industries. 230 Even a party in the same industry as a
prospective intervenor might not, the court held, have identical interests.231
Although the issues in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train in-
volved participation in postsettlement agreement activity, the question of inter-
vention in negotiations leading to agreement on second round regulations should
encompass the same considerations. The court should consider the possibility of
inconsistent interests between existing parties and potential intervenors and the
practical constraints on an agency's use of the comment period on the second
round regulations to address those interests. Although a liberal right of inter-
vention may make negotiations somewhat more difficult, the settlement should
not be achieved at the expense of exclusion of interested parties.
3. Judicial Approval
Courts are partners in settlement agreements, unlike other forms of negotiated
regulations. In the case of settlements implemented through a consent judg-
ment, the court has effectively made an adjudication, and it has the authority to
assess independently whether the content of the agreement is in the public inter-
est.232 Even when a settlement agreement is implemented through a stay, the
court has exercised its discretion to grant the parties' motion.
A court's role in reviewing the propriety of a settlement agreement is limited.
In many cases, the issues are technical, involving scientific and engineering de-
226. 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
227. 561 F.2d at 911.
228. Id. at 912.
229. Id. at 912-13.
230. Id. at 913.
231. Id.
232. Congress mandates such a review for the approval of antitrust consent judgments. See supra notes
176 to 180 and accompanying text (discussing the Tunney Act). But courts generally have the authority
to determine if consent decrees are fair. One court stated that "[e]ntry of such ajudgment is a judicial act
which deserves more than a court's rubber stamp on the agency's action." United States v. Ketchikan
Pulp Co., 430 F. Supp. 83, 86 (D. Ala. 1977). In exercising this authority, another court stated, "prior to
approving a consent decree a court must satisfy itself of the settlement's 'overall fairness to beneficiaries
and consistency with the public interest.' United States v. Trucking Employers, Inc., 561 F.2d 313, 317
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (quoting United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826, 850 (5th Cir. 1975)).
See also Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006, 1014 (7th Cir.
1980) (in settlement court need not inquire into precise legal rights of parties nor reach merits but only
determine if settlement is fair, adequate, reasonable, and appropriate). Ketchikan, 430 F. Supp. at 86 (in




tails, and a court has no basis for exercising independent judgment.233 In most
cases the settlements do not embody final changes in position; the obligation to
undergo rulemaking before adopting revised regulations ensures that there will
be additional public scrutiny.
Nonetheless, a court in this situation need not be a rubber stamp for positions
negotiated between a public agency and affected parties. Private negotiations
can produce compromises that are not necessarily in the public interest.234 To
avoid collusive settlements, a court should require some justification before it
implements the settlement agreement. The court might consider two proce-
dures. First, in most cases, it should require the agency to submit a written
explanation of its change in position from the first round final regulation. This is
a minimal step to ensure that the court is familiar with both the provisions of the
agreement and the compromises the agency has made. The parties' knowledge
that their positions will be subject to scrutiny can only be healthy for the process.
Second, the court may in some cases require public comment on the proposed
settlement agreement itself. In approving the Flannery Decree, the court took
this unusual step.235 Although the comment period in that case was limited, it
gave the public the right to question the terms of the agreement. As noted
above, the Department of Justice requires public comment before court approval
of antitrust and pollution control consent judgments.2 36
Unlike enforcement or antitrust consent judgments, however, settlement
agreements involving challenges to regulations will generally entail public com-
ment on the proposed second round regulation. Thus, comment on the settle-
ment agreement itself is of less importance and would presumably be used only
in unusual circumstances. Nonetheless, because of the practical effect of the set-
tlement agreement on the agency's flexibility the court should ensure that the
agency has adequately justified its position before it, in effect, ratifies the
agreement.
4. Judicial Review
True judicial scrutiny of a negotiated settlement will come, if it comes at all,
when a party seeks judicial review of the final, second round regulation. Pre-
sumably such challenges will be rare, since most interested parties will have par-
ticipated in the settlement process. However, in those cases where parties have
not joined in the agreement or new parties are challenging the content of the
233. This problem arises in court approval of the settlement of complex enforcement cases. As one
court observed, "the court's time, talents and resources for intensive scrutiny" of an antitrust consent
decree are "severely limited." United States v. CIBA Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
234. See Cascade Natural Gas" Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Corp., 386 U.S. 129, 142 (1967) (lower
courts' acceptance of private settlement agreement not in accord with Supreme Court's previous mandate
to divest). Note, The 1TT Dividend: Reform of the Department of Justice Consent Decree Procedures, 73
COLUM. L. Rnv. 594, 595 (1973) (deficiencies in consent decree process and need for legislative reform
underscored by ITT antitrust settlement).
235. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 8 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 2121.
236. Consent Judgments in Actions to Enjoin Discharges of Pollutants, 28 C.F.R. § 50.7 (1983); Proce-
dures for Receipt and Consideration of Written Comments Submitted under the Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act, 28 C.F.R. § 50.13 (1983); see United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 147 (D.D.C. 1982)
(Justice Department solicited comments in settlement agreement on which court issued memo identifying
issues for adjudication).
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final regulation, the court will be called on to review the validity of the agency's
decision.
The APA provides an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review for infor-
mal rulemaking. 237 The content of this standard is at best elusive. One court
noted:
We must accord the agency considerable, but not too much deference;
it is entitled to exercise its discretion, but only so far and no further;
and its decision need not be ideal or even, perhaps, correct so long as
not "arbitrary" or "capricious" and so long as the agency gave at least
minimal consideration to the relevant facts as contained in the
record.238
Although there is debate as to whether the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
differs from other articulated standards of review, such as the "substantial evi-
dence" standard associated with review of adjudications, 239 it is thought to re-
flect a less stringent level of judicial scrutiny of agency decisions.24°
Even if it is impossible to define precisely the standard of review a court is to
employ, a court clearly should grant substantial deference to the agency's judg-
ment.241 The reasons for this deference have been articulated many times. In
part it rests on the agency's technical expertise and familiarity with the area. In
part it reflects the agency's experience in interpreting the statutes it administers.
In part it is based on a view that an agency needs flexibility to deal with new and
difficult problems.242
Not all cases apply the minimal scrutiny associated with the "arbitrary and
capricious" standard or the deference to agency judgment associated with judi-
cial review.243 In situations where the basis for judicial deference is less compel-
237. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (1982); see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)
(record short of formal findings needed to apply arbitrary and capricious standard ofreview); see generally
J. O'REILLY, supra note 6, § 15.01.
238. American Petroleum Inst., 661 F.2d at 349.
239. See Associated Indus. v. Department of Labor, 487 F.2d 342, 349-50 (2d Cir. 1973) (questioning
whether distinction between arbitrary and capricious and substantial evidence test merely semantic).
240. See Consumers Union v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 491 F.2d 810, 812 (2d Cir. 1974) (rec-
ord need not be as complete under arbitrary and capricious standard as under substantial evidence
standard).
241. See National Soft Drink Ass'n v. Block, 721 F.2d 1348, 1353 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("hombook law"
that deference must be afforded to expertise of agency and court must avoid substituting its opinion for
that of administrator); Loyola Univ. v. FCC, 670 F.2d 1222, 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (same); Ethyl Corp v.
EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); see also O'Reilly, Defer-
ence Makes a Difference: A Study of Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CINN. L.
REv. 739 (1980) (analyzing amendment to require that agency decisions be substantially supported by
record); Woodward & Levin, In Defense of Deference, 31 AD. L. REv. 329 (1979) (judicial deference to
agency interpretation of statute premised on agency's practical experience).
242. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 566 n.20 (agency's consistent, long-
standing interpretation given considerable weight) (1979); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842
(D.C. Cir.) (court should defer to agency interpretation because of involvement in passing legislation and
congressional acquiesence), cerL denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973).
243. Flexibility in exercise of these standards is generally acknowledged. As the Supreme Court noted,
"Some scope of discretion in applying the formula can be avoided only by falsifying the actual process of
judging or by using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry." Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951); see also Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's Understanding,
45 N.Y.U. L. RE,. 201 (1970) (providing informal pragmatic view of judicial approach to review of
agency action); McGowan, Congress, the Courts and Control of Delegated Power, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 119
(1977) (searching for new ways to control exercise of delegated rulemaking).
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ling, courts will give increased scrutiny to agency actions. Certainly regarding
questions of law, courts are less willing to defer to agency interpretations.
244
Even when reviewing agency decisions based on factual matters, some courts
have employed a so-called "hard look" approach, under which they will scruti-
nize the record strictly for support of the agency's decision.245 Finally, courts
have focused on the nature of the procedures to determine the appropriate stan-
dard of review.246 In some circumstances, that suggest administrative irregulari-
ties, such as a change in procedures or a reversal of longstanding interpretation,
courts are less likely to defer to the agency's decision.247 Thus, there is ample
room within the accepted standard of review of informal rulemaking to allow a
court to give agency rules a "hard look" with more limited deference to the
agency's determination.
This stricter form of scrutiny may be appropriate when reviewing challenges
to rules developed through settlement agreements. 248 The rationales associated
244. See Volkswagenwerk Akliengesellschaft v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 390 U.S. 261, 272-23
(1968) (no deference to commission's interpretation of statute when it is deemed inconsistent with statu-
tory mandate). But see Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
1102, 1107-08 (1985) (agency interpretation rational enough to preclude court from substituting judgment
where legislative history and purpose did not reveal contrary congressional intent); Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2782-83 (1984) (agency's interpretation of
statute must be upheld if it is possibly legitimate).
245. See National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (noting that "hard
look" connotes rigorous judicial review, court remands case for agency to provide enough data to show
systematic approach to problem); cf Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C.
Cir. 1970) (court will uphold agency findings where satisfied agency has taken "hard look" at issues with
use of reasons and standards), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). See also Leventhal, Environmental Deci-
sionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974). The "hard look" doctrine may
represent an expansion of the traditional interpretation of a court's role in reviewing regulations under the
APA. The significance of the Supreme Court's ruling in Vermont Yankee is unclear. See supra note 89.
246. For example, in Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
the court stated that in reviewing regulations developed pursuant to informal rulemaking, "[t]he para-
mount objective is to see whether the agency, given an essentially legislative task to perform, has carried it
out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness and irrationality in the formulation of
rules for general application in future." Id. at 338.
247. See National Conservative Political Action Comm. v. Federal Election Comm. 626 F.2d 953, 959
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (FEC regulation invalid where it failed to follow usual publication procedures on which
plaintiff relied).
248. Professor Harter has suggested that in negotiated regulations "a stringent standard of review
would be inappropriate." Harter, supra note 2, at 103. See also Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and
Administrative Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1256, 1348 (1981) (arguing that courts
should not heighten scrutiny of negotiated regulations because of objections that could have been raised
during negotiations). Harter's concern is that parties will have no incentive to participate if the consensus
could be undone by a challenge from a party who had not participated. He asserts that deference to the
product of consensus is appropriate since, among other things, the "negotiation process guarantees that
the concerns of interested parties are addressed, thereby eliminating the need to review the entire factual
basis of the agreement." Harter, supra note 2, at 107.
In Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for the Courts?, 10 COLUM. J. ENv. L. I
(1985), Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit responds to Professor Harter's suggestion. Judge Wald notes that
Professor Harter would still have the courts review negotiated regulations to determine if they were within
the agency's jurisdiction and whether a regulation "actually reflects a consensus among interested par-
ties." Harter, supra note 2, at 103. Commenting on the legal issues involved in an assessment of "agency
jurisdiction" and the difficulties of assessing both the achievement of consensus and the participation of
"interested" parties, she concludes that "[o]n balance, then, I am not at all sure that courts would become
substantially less involved in negotiated regulations under Professor Harter's judicial review standard.
Inevitably, each phrase in the proposed new standard of judicial review opens up its own Pandora's box."
Wald, supra at 23.
As Judge Wald notes in her article, Professor Harter's suggestion is premised on a view of rulemaking
in which the legitimacy of rulemaking is conferred by an agency's reconciliation of the "political and
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with deference are not as compelling in the context of negotiated compromises
with affected parties. Such regulations do not reflect longstanding agency inter-
pretations; in fact, they reflect a reversal of earlier positions adopted in the first
round rule. The process of developing regulations through settlement agreement
raises questions as to the good faith application of agency judgment. Even the
purely factual and technical elements of agency rules are more suspect when
developed by compromise with affected parties.
Thus, one final tool that courts might employ in supervising the outcome of
the settlement agreement is the use of a more stringent standard of review. Es-
sentially, courts should be more reluctant to defer to agency judgments where
those judgments have been made through private negotiations. Although such a
"hard look" may threaten negotiated regulations with little factual or legal basis,
this result may be entirely appropriate where affected parties include people who
have not agreed to the substance of privately negotiated rules.
V. CONCLUSION
The very basis for informal rulemaking under the APA is participation by an
informed public and independent judgment by a government agency responsible
for implementing congressional intent. The use of settlement agreements to ne-
gotiate the content of regulations raises a troubling paradox. On one hand, en-
forceable agreements that contain the content of regulations may be developed in
private among affected parties and negotiated with an agency that may be com-
promising public interest to avoid litigation. This is something not normally
contemplated in the process of rulemaking. On the other hand, regulatory judg-
ments based in part on the prospect of litigation are hardly novel, and the pro-
cess of negotiations with affected parties can produce reasonable regulations
without the full expense and uncertainty of litigation.
Rulemaking by settlement agreement, although potentially subject to abuse,
has been used effectively to implement rulemaking responsibilities. As long as
the process is recognized and subject to suitable controls by the courts, it should
be viewed as a part of the normal and accepted process of informal rulemaking.
practical interests as expressed by interest group representatives." Id. Although consensus and reconcili-
ation are certainly objectives to be promoted, the procedures for achieving these objectives, as discussed
above, lend themselves to abuse. Experience with antitrust consent decrees, for example, suggests that
such abuse can be minimized by adequate judicial review of the process.
In the context of informal rulemaking by settlement agreement, a stringent standard of review seems
appropriate. The context of the settlement provides ample incentive for the parties to participate, but it
also provides a disincentive for the agency to be fully responsive to public comments. Thus, the proce-
dures themselves suggest the possibility of arbitrariness and irrationality, and, when regulations are chal-
lenged, a more searching review is appropriate.
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